104

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

Y 4. IN 8/16: IS 4

The Threat of Islamic Extremism in...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 6, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
JUL 26 1995
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPARTMENT

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

90–834 WASHINGTON : 1995

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047206-7

04

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

4. IN 8/16: IS 4

he Threat of Islamic Extremism in...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 6, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
JUL 26 1995
BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS DEPOSITORY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
90–834 WASHINGTON : 1995

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047206-7

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, *Chairman*

WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
JAY KIM, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona
AMO HOUGHTON, New York

LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
ALBERT RUSSELL WYNN, Maryland
MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
VICTOR O. FRAZER, Virgin Islands (Ind.)

RICHARD J. GARON, *Chief of Staff*
MICHAEL H. VAN DUSEN, *Democratic Chief of Staff*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, *Chairperson*

TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
DAVID FUNDERBURK, North Carolina
STEVEN J. CHABOT, Ohio
MARSHALL "MARK" SANFORD, South Carolina
MATT SALMON, Arizona

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
HARRY JOHNSTON, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida

MAURICIO TAMARGO, *Subcommittee Staff Director*
PHILIP CHRISTENSON, *Deputy Staff Director*
DAVID FELTMAN, *Democratic Professional Staff Member*

CONTENTS

WITNESSES

	Page
Steve Emerson, executive producer, "Jihad in America"	4
Jason F. Isaacson, director of Government and International Affairs, American Jewish Committee	9
Dr. Khalid Duran, editor, TransState Islam and fellow, National Strategy Information Center	14

APPENDIX

Prepared statements:	
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen	27
Hon. Donald M. Payne	31
Steve Emerson	32
Jason F. Isaacson	47
Dr. Khalid Duran	57

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1995

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:18 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. The Subcommittee on Africa will now come to order. The other witnesses are on their way and will be here shortly. We were trying to delay the beginning of the hearing to have them come and listen to the opening statements, but I thank the members for their patience and we will begin right away.

I must admit that it was not an easy task trying to find a name for this hearing which accurately reflected the issues that we hoped to address here today, terrorism and insurgency. We rejected the term "Islamic fundamentalism" because believing and practicing one's religion, be it Islam, Christianity, or Judaism, is a trait that I personally admire and I am sure that all of us in our subcommittee do as well. We firmly believe that the world needs more people who genuinely live according to their religious convictions.

Our use of the term "Islamic extremism" stems from our recognition of this fact, that Islam, as a religion, is a positive influence on our society and not our enemy.

There have always been Islamic fundamentalists who have preached rigorous conformity to what the Koran dictates. These traditionalists are concerned with personal ethics and spirituality and firmly believe in the ideals of brotherhood and unity. They followed the straight path, or God's laws as revealed to Mohammed, not just for their own salvation, but for the good of the entire Moslem community. This concept of community is an essential component of Islam.

Moderate Islamic organizations interpret this idea as their obligation to reform their societies and political systems to conform to the values set forth in the Koran. The focus of their efforts is usually the reform of personal behavior and of the domestic, socio-economic scenario, all noble endeavors.

To reiterate, Islam and true legitimate Moslem fundamentalists are not the cause of our concern. We are here to discuss those groups who unequivocally pose a security threat to the United States and indeed to the international community. We are here to

discuss the actions of those who distort the concept of a Moslem brotherhood. They invoke God's name in vain and utilize the Koran to justify their acts of terrorism. Whether for religious or secular motivations, those who seek to impose their will through violence and terror must be stopped. These are the ones that we oppose. These are the ones that we must protect ourselves from.

Islamic militancy has emerged as one of the most serious threats to Western security. It has increased interregional tensions and is forging new unholy alliances over the challenge posed by it. While the perception of Islamic extremism as exclusively a Middle Eastern problem lives on, thousands of African Islamic militants are being trained in making bombs, throwing hand grenades, and shooting assault weapons.

In the more exclusive training camps, veterans of the Afghan war are providing advanced military training in the operation of antiaircraft weapons and tanks. In Algeria, terrorists assassinate feminists, journalists, and secular intellectuals in the streets with the number of deaths totaling over 40,000. Their objective is to overthrow the military government which they claim cheated an Islamic political party of its victory at the poll 3 years ago. If this goal is achieved, this new fanatical dictatorial regime will help feed xenophobia in relation to the outside world and will quench any progress for international relations.

The crisis in Algeria, however, is but a microcosm of a larger problem. There are many U.S. policymakers, some perhaps at the State Department, who emphasize that Islamic extremism is too diffuse to be called a movement, that it lacks one leader and one agenda. They must not be listening to the statements made by these Islamic militant groups. They may not answer to a single individual; however, they do have a common theme, a cause which drives them to take any risk necessary to achieve their end. They believe that frontiers could never divide Moslems because they are one nation. They will always remain one single entity.

They are sworn to fight the "Great Satan America" for the global supremacy of Islam. In this context, it is clear that Islamic extremism and militant groups pose a direct threat to regional stability, to the fragile democracies of the African continent, and to U.S security interests. They overtly challenge U.S. leadership and that of its allies by making them primary targets of their hatred and their hostility.

For those who state that this is not an international problem, that the United States is beyond the reach of these terrorist groups, I can only respond by saying—remember New York! Remember the World Trade Center! For those who reiterate this is not a problem in Africa, I can only remind them that a majority of the defendants in the New York bombing trials are from African countries.

Before I recognize the members of our panel who are joining us today, I would like to recognize the members of our subcommittee for their opening statements. Mr. Payne.

[The prepared statement of Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen appears in the appendix.]

STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, very much, Madam Chairperson. As we know, Islam is a major religion in Africa, and I would like to congratulate you on your sensitivity in the selection of today's subject. The title does not indicate that Islam is a threat, but only extremism is. I believe you have chosen wisely because there are those who would like to replace the threat of the cold war or the red threat with the green threat.

This unfortunately denotes that all Moslems are a threat. I feel that this is far from the actual situation as we look worldwide. According to the Overseas Development Council here in Washington, there are approximately 924 million Moslems around the world representing 18 percent of the world's population. Although Islam is associated mainly with the Middle East, more than 71 percent of the world's countries are considered members of the Dar al Islam or House of Islam.

Islam is a major religion in such African countries as Algeria, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tunisia, and to a lesser degree in Benin, Bukina, Cameroon, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Nigeria.

It is my understanding of the Islamic faith that there is nothing in their religion that opposes democracy. Islamic faith embodies the recourse of Shura as a principle governing relations between the political authority and the people. In democracy, the instrument of elections, parliamentary systems, and the separation of power would seem to implement the Shura.

However, Islamic political movements are not monolithic in nature. Some Moslems believe that Islam is an all inclusive code that guides political, social, and economic action. More extreme Moslems reject social change and democratic principles. Scholars point out that the rage and violence associated with Moslem extremism are not a reflection of Islamic law or values, but are instead an expression of religious radicalism, ultranationalism and feelings of economic and social disenfranchisement.

These points are illustrated by both the situation in Algeria and Saudi Arabia. In Algeria, a military government canceled a democratic election in fear of losing to an Islamic party that was successful in local elections, thus turning the country to the present state of civil war. On the other hand, although the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia is considered one of the most orthodox Islamic regimes in the world. It is also an ally to the United States, a foremost critic of Islamic radicalism or extremism.

So we have a very complex subject and that is all I tried to point out, to discuss. We have no easy answers, but once again I hope that our panel is well-balanced to present this sensitive subject in a balanced approach and once again, Mrs. Chairperson, I commend you for taking a stab at a beginning and attempting to understand this very difficult and sensitive subject.

[The prepared statement of Congressman Payne appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Payne. This is just the beginning. We will have more hearings, and we will have other

panelists with other points of view to present at future hearings. Mr. Houghton.

Mr. HOUGHTON. [No comment.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Madam Chair, in the interest of time, I would like to revise and extend my remarks and associate myself with remarks that you made and that Mr. Payne made.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Hastings. And now it is a pleasure to introduce the members of our distinguished panel.

Our first speaker is Steven Emerson who has been named by the New York Post as the Nation's foremost journalistic expert on terrorism. He was recently named the recipient of the George Polk award, one of the Nation's most prestigious journalism honors, for his PBS documentary, "Jihad in America."

Previously, he worked as an investigative reporter for CNN and is a senior editor for U.S. News & World Report. Mr. Emerson has received numerous-accolades for his investigative reporting. He is the author and coauthor of several books dealing with terrorism. Currently, he is working on a new documentary series and a book on the issue of radical Islamic movements in America.

He will be followed by Mr. Jason Isaacson who is the Director of Government and International Affairs for the American Jewish Committee. During his tenure at the committee, he has served as an observer in 1991 and 1992 at the Middle East peace talks in Madrid, Moscow, and Washington. He also represented the committee at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Previously, Mr. Isaacson served as chief of staff and press secretary to Senator Chris Dodd and as press secretary to then-Representative Ratchford of Connecticut. He is a journalist by trade and a founder of the Independent News Service, a Washington based syndicate.

The last member of the panel is Dr. Khalid Duran. Dr. Duran is currently a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies and editor of TransState Islam. Since 1986, he has served as visiting professor of Islamic studies at various universities throughout the United States. He has also taught several courses on Islamic culture and Islamic mysticism at the Smithsonian Institution and served as a researcher at the Institute of Iranian Studies at Freie Universitact Berlin. Furthermore, he has lectured on this issue at universities in Scandinavia, France, Italy, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Egypt. He has authored several books and is a frequent contributor to major European newspapers and academic journals, as well as magazines of major European political foundations. I would like to welcome all of you and I thank you for being here today. Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, very much. I will present an abbreviated form of the comments I have prepared and ask that the full text of my speech this morning be submitted for the record.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Of course. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF STEVE EMERSON, EXECUTIVE PRODUCER, "JIHAD IN AMERICA"

Mr. EMERSON. I thank the subcommittee for inviting me here to speak on Islamic fundamentalism. I think this is a subject that is

becoming the most important, captivating, and wrenching dramatic political story, not just of the present, but of the next century. What we are witnessing is a true life drama being played out throughout the world with life-and-death consequences for entire nations and peoples.

By way of background, I am an author, journalist, documentarian, and specialist in the areas of terrorism and the Middle East and the author of four books dealing with U.S. national security in the Middle East. I have also served for CNN and U.S. News & World Report as a correspondent.

For the past 2 years, I have been investigating Islamic extremist networks around the world and in particular their links in and throughout the United States. This investigation has taken me to 25 foreign countries as well as more than 200 American cities, municipalities, and communities. Together with my colleagues I have collected more than 150,000 documents, records, videos, tapes, manuscripts, publications, and reports, dealing with the issue of radical Islamic fundamentalism which probably constitutes one of the largest archives of primary radical Islamic intelligence material anywhere in the world.

During the past 2 years I have also conducted hundreds of interviews with officials in United States, European, and Middle Eastern law enforcement and intelligence, and also have conducted more than 700 interviews with Moslem citizens, both secular and religious, Islamic militants and fundamentalists, Mujahideen leaders, and terrorist chieftains in North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States.

Last November, in the first of a series of journalistic projects resulting from my investigation, I served as executive producer and correspondent for a PBS documentary entitled "Jihad in America." My colleague Khalid Duran served as the editorial adviser.

The film documented the hitherto unknown infrastructure of radical Islamic networks operating on American soil, ranging from the hamas to the Sudanese National Islamic Front, to the Hizba-tarir to Palestine Islamic Jihad. The broad emergence of militant Islamic fundamentalism can be considered an extension of the struggle for the heart and soul of Islam, a faith that is the most vibrant, fascinating, and energetic religion in the world today.

Islam is currently being wrenched by existential confrontations pitting modernists versus fundamentalists and secularists versus militants in a duel-to-the-death challenge over mankind's most primal competition, to determine whose god will reign supreme, which is really only a guise for the competition of whose state will reign supreme.

At the very outset of my statement, I would like to state that militant Islamic fundamentalism is not synonymous with Islam the religion. The vast overwhelming majority of the world's more than 1 billion Moslems do not condone violence or militancy. It is only a small minority of Moslems that are militant. Moreover, throughout its history, Islam has expressed itself in a wide variety of trends from a pragmatic and tolerant inward-looking approach to a militant one.

Therefore, it is vitally important to point out that contemporary Islamic groups that claim to represent pure fundamental theo-

logical doctrine of Islam are merely representing totalitarian interpretation of Islamic theology. The issue facing the West today is not whether to declare war on Islam as some U.S. academicians and fundamentalist spokesmen have characterized the debate over U.S. policy. Rather, the issue is whether the United States will recognize that what fuels violence and extremism is the militant's interpretation of Islam, and understanding the militant's interpretation of Islam unhindered by the prism of our liberal Judeo-Christian values or the deliberate obfuscation by militants playing upon Western naivete is the only way U.S. policymakers and the public will be able to arrive at an effective and viable means of dealing with this dilemma.

Jihad in America represented only a snapshot of a far more extensive phenomenon in the United States today. The increasing support networks of radical Islamic fundamentalists within the United States dedicated to advancing extremist goals and militant agendas as a deliberate corollary of the militant's objectives also include the destruction of any embryonic roots of Islamic secularism and reformism.

Radical Islamic networks now constitute the primary domestic as well as international national security threat facing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. On a more visceral level the documentary showed beyond any doubt the true, yet often hidden, agenda of Islamic militants.

In contrast to the wholly disingenuous statements of radical propagandists, several of whom are in this hearing room today and who tried last November to suppress broadcast of the film, the documentary showed the unvarnished and unfiltered views of the world's senior radical and fundamentalist theologians and military leaders. Their views express an unmitigated rejection of the West and its systems of secularism, pluralism, democracy, and the separation of church and state as well as an unremitting hatred of Jews, Christians, and moderate Moslems or anything or any institution that is perceived to be a surrogate of the West.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the fact that the film showed that radical fundamentalism has become such a widespread development it cannot be delineated any more by conventional geographical international boundaries. Although there is no evidence that any type of pyramidal Islamic fundamental hierarchy exists—in contrast to the old style Communist politburo—the myriad Islamic fundamentalist movements share a basic common agenda in promoting the resurrection of doctrinal early seventh and eighth century Islam.

Although there is no formal collaborative structure, the groups that exist under the Islamic fundamentalist umbrella often collaborate on an ad hoc basis, sharing resources such as support networks, money, dala, or Islamic missionary propaganda, recruitment, military training, or even weapon acquisition.

I should just add parenthetically that in the World Trade Center bombings, investigators and law enforcement have found the involvement of more than five different militant Islamic groups who generally do not collaborate together on operations in the Middle East. But the fundamentalist Diaspora, which focuses on a common enemy, the West, resulted in an unprecedented collaboration.

Nowadays, radical Islamic fundamentalist spokesmen attuned to the negative connotations of the term "fundamentalist", shrewdly try to avoid using the term. Some Islamic groups in Washington go even further. They actually assert that the mere use of the term "fundamentalist" is racist and biased against Moslems and that any discussion of radical Islamic movements is inherently "racist."

Without going into specifics, again, parenthetically, there are groups here that have made this an issue of political correctness. And I think it is very important to point out that those groups that claim to be representing Islam in the United States, that have tried to change the focus of this hearing or that tried to suppress broadcast of my film, do not represent the mainstream of Islam. Rather they represent extremists.

I can tell you a quote given to me by Seif Ashmawi, the Egyptian born and now naturalized U.S. citizen, publisher of the Voice of Peace, and an opponent of radical Islamic fundamentalist who appeared in my film. Recently he told me:

> Groups like CAIR, [Committee on American Islamic Relations] do not really represent Islam or American Moslems. They only claim to represent them. In reality, these groups represent only extremists. Yet, no one seems willing to challenge them to demand who funds them, to force them to reveal their true militant beliefs and their political connections to radical terrorist groups. Perhaps because we Moslems are such a new community in the United States, you cannot expect us to fight it out publicly. But what surprises me is how gullible the American media and government are. How can you blindly accept their statements? If you cannot detect an extremist group in your own backyard, how can you ever hope to contain extremists in the Middle East?

Mr. Ashmawi's comments are important for the subcommittee to ponder. His point about deception is one that goes to the heart of understanding the authentic agenda of the militants.

I think it is important to point out that in Islamic contemporary history it has been the failure of Arab nationalism, corruption of Arab elites, and the repression of authoritarian regimes that increasingly drove the masses into embracing Islam as a refuge and a source of comfort.

Observing militant Islam in faraway Afghanistan or the Middle East, citizens of democracy do recognize the role of religion in the conflict. But when they view the same phenomenon with their own society, bound by their Western democratic morals and values as well as their legal principles, they fail to understand the crux of the problem.

Any religion when abused by militant fundamentalists may serve not only as a source, but as an organizational framework for violence and aggression in the name of God. This was the case with the aberrant Jewish militant groups that have engaged in violence in the West Bank and in Israel over the past few years, with the Branch Davidian Christian fundamentalist cult, and with the militant antiabortion activists. This is also the case with the more popular Islamic movements.

I would like now to turn to a part of the discussion of the latter part of my testimony dealing with the situation in Africa. I think what is important to point out again that it cannot be viewed as a straight linear situation when examining all of these movements. However, there is a common denominator.

In Algeria, it is very difficult to ascertain trends indicating the future stability. The regime now seems to have consolidated its hold in the main cities which constitutes the majority of the secular Westernized and cultured population. Yet, the army seems determined together with the regime to unleash violent, brutal, and merciless attacks. All of this seems to bear results in the fact that some opposition groups are now willing to conduct dialog with the regime, although the regime itself does not seem to be willing to conduct a reciprocal dialog.

Yet, having said that and looking at the fact that more than 40,000 people have been killed in this terrible battle, it is hard to know which side is worse. The brutalization of the fight between the regime and the Islam opponents has unleashed a murderous nightmare in Algiers.

To some democratic pundits, the fact that the regime twice canceled elections that would surely have resulted in Islamic takeovers is proof positive that the stolen elections led directly to the radicalization of FIS. The seemingly rational explanation of how FIS and other groups became radicalized is abetted by the exceptionally sounding moderate statements of various FIS leaders, in particular Anwar Haddam, the American-based FIS leader. Haddam has, for the most part, routinely condemned acts of violence and terrorism while calling for a peaceful transition to power.

I think, however, that some recent research of mine shows, that not all leaders in FIS are bound by Mr. Haddam and that FIS leaders have, in fact, long before the canceled elections, publicly expressed radical views including exhortations to the followers to kill all Jews and Americans.

On January 12, 1991, Paris International Service from Algeria reported on a rally led by FIS leader Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj. It said:

> A war in the gulf could be considered against Algeria, said Abassi Madani, at the Mosque of Kouba in the outskirts of Algiers yesterday. After having observed a long silence on the development of the situation in the gulf, Belhaj and his colleague Madani came out to ask the 6,000 loyal supporters gathered for the prayer as well as all FIS sympathizers to take action. To the question of what to do at the critical moment, the answer is simple. Attack United States and Jewish interests anywhere in the world. In attacking Saddam, Americans and their allies aim at depriving Moslems of the Iraqi military potential useful for the forthcoming decisive war in which the Moslems will wage against the Jews, said Ali Belhaj, referring to once and again interpreting the Koran as he wishes.

In August 1990, Abassi Madani spoke to Algerian journalists about the FIS position in the gulf war. He claimed:

> What is taking place in the gulf is a new form of Crusades in addition to the fact that it is a violation of Islamic sovereignty and an aggression against the sanctity of two holy mosques, given the flagrant United States presence and the Saudi regime's hasty permission for it to be there. The regime has allowed itself to interfere with Allah's will and manage the country as if it owned it. It does not. It is Allah's land, the land of Islam, the land of all Moslems. Therefore, they had no right to open its doors and allow the Americans to bring their colonial forces into it. Third, the Islamic nation cannot endure such regimes anymore.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Excuse me, Mr. Emerson. If you could try to conclude your remarks.

Mr. EMERSON. OK. Regimes that are training and consecrating the borders.

In sum, I would say to you that the real problem is that a small or extremist fringe of minority within the Islamic world has taken headlines, has captured institutional leadership positions in this country, and is also leading a charge against the established leadership in their own country. And unfortunately, I think, are causing a major problem for the great majority of Moslems who do not condone violence in any way. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Isaacson.

STATEMENT OF JASON F. ISAACSON, DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Mr. ISAACSON. Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the invitation to testify today on an issue which is of great salience to our Government, to friendly governments throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe and to citizens here and in many countries who share your commitment to economic and political progress, regional security, and the protection of individual rights on the African Continent.

My testimony today is in abridged form. I hope that you will enter my full written testimony in the hearing record.

I represent the American Jewish Committee, a private, nonprofit organization with some 50,000 members in 34 regional chapters across the United States.

Since 1906, the American Jewish Committee has fostered understanding and cooperation among Americans across religious, ethnic, and racial lines. We have fought bigotry and anti-Semitism in our own country and around the world, protecting Jewish communities and other religious minorities abroad while playing a critical role in advancing the cause of human rights.

We have sought to promote the ideals of American democratic pluralism in other lands, working with governments and private institutions—from Central and Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia, to Latin America—to develop the infrastructure of tolerance and understanding. We have worked to strengthen the mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Israel; in that regard, we have actively supported the Arab-Israeli peace process and the central role played by the United States in advancing that process. As friends of Israel and hopeful but clear eyed supporters of the peace process, the American Jewish Committee has paid particular attention in recent years to two issues that are properly the focus of today's hearing:

First, the threat of terrorism fueled by, or linked to, militant Islamic extremism—a threat to Israel and Israelis, to Jews everywhere, to America and the West generally, indeed, to the values and institutions of modern civilization in North Africa, the Middle East, and across the globe.

Second, the success of moderation in the Arab world, for it is only through the continued well being and stability of moderate Arab regimes, and the continued isolation and ultimate failure of provocative rogue regimes in the region, that reconciliation with Is-

rael will take root and grow, and that the region's economies and prospects for trade and security cooperation will expand.

My perspective on the threat of Islamic extremism in Africa, therefore, is inherently Middle Eastern—bound up in matters of security for Israel and the welfare of Israel's partners in peace now and in the future—as the region's circle of political and economic normalization widens.

I want to be very clear, Madam Chairwoman, about what our concerns are and what they are not. The American Jewish Committee respects the traditional values of Islam as we respect those of other religious faiths. Indeed, we have sought to explore the commonalities and points of difference between Islam and Judaism in national Moslem-Jewish conferences that we have sponsored for the last few years at the University of Denver, and we have initiated or cosponsored Moslem-Jewish dialogs in all of our larger chapters across the country.

AJC has also fought diligently against discrimination and acts of intolerance directed against Arab Americans and American-Moslems, particularly at the time of the gulf war when such incidents occurred with dismaying frequency. We have been proud to work with Arab and Moslem coalition partners on a range of public policy issues in Washington from advocacy of a more forceful United States posture in the Bosnian crisis, to the protection of the rights of religious minorities in our own country.

AJC's record on inter-group relations and our longstanding support for human rights reflects a basic commitment to freedom of religious belief and practice and to safeguarding individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or and ethnic identity.

These rights apply to Moslems, Christians, Jews, and members of any other religion. We assess groups and individuals by their actions without regard to their religious beliefs; and we encourage governments to expand political pluralism and freedom of expression.

In this regard, our concern in North Africa—as in the Middle East and South Asia—is not with the spread of Islam, the flowering or strengthening of Islamic culture, the increasing religiosity of followers of Islam in that or other parts of the world, or the involvement in politics of deeply religious Moslems. As Jews, as fellow children of Abraham, we respect and honor a kindred faith.

Our concern, Madam Chairwoman, is with the politicization of Islam and the manipulation of Islam for extremist ends—ends that would deny individual rights; that would end religious liberty; that would foreclose democratization even in the name of political reform; that would nullify freedom of thought and expression; that would radicalize governments and destabilize strategically vital regions; that would foment or contribute to acts of terrorism; that would pose substantial threats to American interests, American institutions and individuals, and the interests and citizens of friendly states.

Our concern is shared by many governments and individuals of varying political perspectives throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In recent visits by the American Jewish Committee to Tunisia, Jordan, and to the fundamentalist Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we heard from the most senior government officials and from indi-

vidual citizens, expressions of grave concern about the internal and external threat posed by Islamic extremists. Nowhere is the appreciation of the extremist threat greater than in those and other moderate states.

As we said in a recent advertisement urging strong action against terrorism that was placed by AJC in newspapers and magazines in the United States and abroad, "Moderate Arab States must be supported in their efforts to contain the forces of extremism. They are on the front line in this struggle."

Surely many hardcore members of extremist groups in North Africa and the Middle East act out of religious inspiration—that is, their misinterpretation and distortion of Islamic values to suit a political agenda, and to justify violent, terrorist means.

In the Seventh Islamic Conference Organization summit in Casablanca last December, it was just such misinterpretation and distortion that was strikingly singled out by the 50 member-nations in Item Three of their Final Communique when they condemned terrorism carried out in the name of Islam as "a clear deviation from the teachings of the righteous Islamic religion and blatant violation of our values, norms, and heritage."

But although radical Islam may be a catalyst or a cover for political action, it appears that the key factors in the extremists' success in mobilizing mass support, as Assistant Secretary of State Pelletreau has pointed out, are economic, social, and political deprivation.

I would like to describe the threat as we see it, assess its impact on U.S. interests, and explain how it effects issues of concerns to AJC specifically.

The two most serious threats from Islamic extremist groups in North Africa are in Sudan and Algeria.

Since a 1989 military coup, Sudan has been governed by an increasingly extremist Islamic regime. The ruling national Islamic Front is headed by Hassan Turabi, who has ties to extremist elements in Algeria, Iran, and Egypt. A haven for terrorist groups operating against Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and Israel, Sudan is on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism. Its military is pinned down by a civil war to the south and it receives training from Iran's Revolutionary Guards.

Eight of those currently suspected of planning terrorist attacks on public, government, and U.N. sites in New York City have Sudanese passports. Sudan's intentions, like those of Iran, may be both ambitious and dangerous for the entire region. State sponsorship of terrorism must be ended, and the United States must exert its leadership to that end.

The situation in Algeria, presently and for the near future, is one of uneasy stalemate. Neither the military-backed Government nor the array of Islamic extremist groups has the upper hand in what some have labeled a full-fledged civil war. Any lasting solution will have to be political in nature. But a victory by extremists, however unwelcome, cannot be ruled out completely.

The 1991 parliamentary elections gave the Islamic Salvation Front, or FIS, a decisive victory, and this victory was owed largely to two factors. First, the ruling National Liberation Front, or FLN, had served Algerians poorly in its nearly 30-year reign; government

corruption, economic failure, and political repression had cost it much support. Second, the FIS constituted the only opposition party with the organization and capacity to mobilize voters.

Since the FIS was banned in 1992 and its leaders either arrested or deported, the Armed Islamic Group, or GIA, has descended from a guerrilla force exclusively attacking military targets into a ruthless terrorist organization. Its victims include thousands of women and children, intellectuals, politicians, tourists, and foreign workers. Human rights violations abound on both sides of the conflict, and the violence continues to escalate as I speak.

This grave situation is not one we would wish to see repeated elsewhere in North Africa. It is my hope and belief that continued diligence on the part of other governments in the region, with our and other nations' support, can avert such an eventuality. Many in Tunisia and Morocco, fearing any repeat of the Algerian crisis, accept their governments' strict measures against extremists.

Pro-Western regimes in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt are concerned about the insurgency in Algeria and its impact on extremist elements in their countries and, in the cases of Morocco and Tunisia, on the stability of their border with Algeria. Egypt has already seen a number of attacks by the Islamic Group or Gama'at which do not threaten the regime's stability but do create increasing economic problems, discourage tourism and foreign investment, and prevent the Government from expanding political freedoms.

Madam Chairwoman, I would like at this time to acknowledge the substantial progress achieved in North Africa and elsewhere. Some of the key countries in the Middle East and North African regions are successfully promoting democracy alongside traditional Islamic culture. Turkey has demonstrated a significant commitment to secular democratic rule. Jordan and Morocco exemplify the emergence of constitutional monarchies committed to democratization and pluralism. Tunisia has achieved impressive economic reforms and standard of living, and a recent broadening of political reform. Egypt's Parliament and press allow free debate, and President Hasni Mubarak retains popular legitimacy as he grapples with economic and political challenges.

While it would be wrong to call any of these regimes democratic by American standards, it is worth recognizing the challenges lining their road to liberalization. The prospects for stability and democratization in North Africa and the Middle East are hopeful, but the United States and our allies must act clearly and consistently to ensure the continuation and expansion of these positive trends.

In February, AJC delegations visited Jordan as well as Tunisia, and let me briefly relate some of our impressions from those missions as they relate to the subject of today's hearing.

Jordan's King Hussein is clearly committed to peace with Israel, and we expressed to him our tremendous admiration for his leadership and our appreciation of his efforts which resulted in last October's peace treaty. AJC's President Robert Rifkind also conveyed AJC's concern over the increasing threat from Islamic extremism. The AJC delegation took special note, in the case of Jordan, of the domestic progress over the past 5 years beginning with the National Charter of 1990, parliamentary elections with the participation of Islamist and Palestinian parties, and substantive economic

reforms—all constituting a resolute bulwark against extremism and a positive development for greater political freedoms and economic growth.

In North Africa, Tunisia faces the extremist threat armed with a strong record of social and economic reforms. Home ownership is 70 percent. Inflation stands at 5 percent. School enrollment exceeds 85 percent. And population growth has declined to 1.9 percent. The Government is trying to privatize.

In other words, Tunisians have a stake in their society. The Government has successfully kept the public invested in the stability of the current political system. More reforms are needed, especially on the political side, but they are moving in the right direction.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Isaacson, if we could ask you to summarize.

Mr. ISAACSON. Certainly.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you.

Mr. ISAACSON. I wanted to just add one more line if I might about our visit to Tunisia. Tunisia's Minister of Interior told our delegation when we were there, "Social and economic development and well-being are the best defenders against terrorism." Madam Chairwoman, we could not agree more.

Scholars of Islam disagree over whether there are pragmatists among the extremist elements in certain states in the region who are willing to compromise and live with the West for economic reasons on the one hand, and those who maintain there are no moderates at all, only that some groups mask their hostility to the West in order to gain support and credibility. AJC does not oppose dialog in principle. But we must strive not to lend legitimacy in world eyes to radicals who present a face of moderation to the West while, in fact, pursuing an anti-Western, hostile agenda that uses violence and terror as methods for political change.

As we focus on Islamic extremism in key African States, we must pay particular attention to the human rights dimension. The degree of atrocities in Algeria is truly shocking. The death toll is near 40,000. Since taking power in 1989, the Sudanese regime has severely restricted political rights and introduced religious coercion and persecution. The imposition of Islamic law on Christians and secular Muslems has been tragic. The best avenue for guaranteeing human rights in North Africa is to hold violators accountable while working with friendly governments to achieve greater social equity and political freedoms.

Madam Chairwoman, there are very direct challenges facing United States policy interests today in the region of North Africa: combating terrorism, advancing human rights, protecting democratization and the rule of law, strengthening the Arab—Israeli peace process, and containing the rogue states seeking to undermine the forces of moderation and peace. We will need wisdom, resolve, courage, and perseverance, qualities that our great Nation has in abundance when we mobilize our collective will. We can succeed. Thank you for this opportunity.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Isaacson appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much.

Mr. Duran.

90-834 O - 95 - 2

STATEMENT OF DR. KHALID DURAN, EDITOR, TRANSSTATE ISLAM AND FELLOW, NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER

Mr. DURAN. Madam Chairwoman, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on the threats posed by widespread and growing Islamic extremism in Africa.

I served for 7 years as an associate professor of Islamic studies in Islamabad. And I emphasize this in order to make it plain that I am not talking just as an analyst, as an outside observer, but as a Muslem concerned.

In the Muslem world these days, a distinction is made between Islam and Islamism. Islam is the old religion. Islamism is a new ideology. Those whom the Western media call Islamic extremist go by the name Islamists. We distinguish between Muslems, the common followers of Islamic religion and Islamists who have chosen this name for themselves as a mark of distinction.

As is the wont with totalitarianism, Islamism thrives on hatred for a principal enemy. This enemy is the West in general and the United States in particular. Jews and the State of Israel are seen as one with the United States.

Islamists complain that the West is looking at them as the new enemy after the fall of Communism. Such complaints are a mockery. Numerous statements make it plain in so many words that Islamists relish nothing as much as to be regarded as threat to the West.

In the United States, visiting Islamist leaders have told their audiences, with glee, that America will vanish the way the other superpower vanished. World leadership will then be taken over by the Islamists. With the present regime in Iran, this has been a favorite topic for more than a decade.

Sudan's de facto head of state, Dr. Hasan At-Turabi is presently the most dynamic and successful Islamist leader. He is the General Secretary of the Popular Arab Islamic Conference with headquarters in Khartoum.

As a result, the focus of Islamist activities has shifted, at least in part, from Asia to Africa. As the largest country in Africa, Sudan borders on eight states and all of those complain about Sudanese interference and subversion, usually by extremist organizations of local Islamists who receive funding or weapons from Khartoum.

This is most blatant in the case of Eritrea whose predominately Muslem population has chosen a Christian as its President. Eritrea has repeatedly complained to the United Nations about an Islamist insurgency that is totally dependent on Sudan. There is much talk about war between the two countries. Eritrea has similar complaints about Sudan and so has Kenya.

Sudan's conflict with Uganda has deteriorated into a kind of border war. Khartoum has a problem with all of those neighboring countries in as much as they do not cooperate in quelling the insurgency in southern Sudan. None of Sudan's black African neighbor states can stay neutral vis-a-vis the war between northern Sudan's Arabized Muslems and largely Christianized Africans in southern Sudan.

The entire conflict might be presented as one of a regional nature to be resolved by a compromise: You do not help my insurgents and

I do not help yours. However, Sudan also supports Islamist insurgents in the north. Egyptian Islamists take refuge in Sudan and infiltrate back into Egypt with weapons.

African Muslems in the neighboring countries feel uneasy about the propaganda unfolded by the regime in Khartoum. The Islamists propagate this war as a Jihad, a holy war against infidels. This causes many Africans in other states to fear and hate their Muslem fellow citizens.

Sudanese relations with the northern dominated regime in neighboring Chad are relatively good with Islamist teachers from Sudan indoctrinating Chadian Muslems. The result is another outbreak of the old conflict between Chad's Muslem north and Christian south. The country has a history of civil war not unlike that of Sudan. If Chad is to stay together, it needs serious efforts at reconciliation between north and south, between Muslems and Christians. Khartoums influence has the opposite effect.

Outside Sudan, Islamists are busy projecting the Sudanese war as one of an African Nation against the American superpower. As they say, a Third World country is struggling to preserve its independence and national unity. The majority of the southern Sudanese are with the government, they claim. Only a minority fights, instigated by Israel and the United States.

By contrast, Tanzania felt constrained to expel three Sudanese preachers, accusing them of subversive activities. Here as elsewhere, the issue was Islamist propaganda against the country's secular constitution. They insist that the country with a Muslem majority ought not to be ruled by non-Muslems.

The proportion of Muslems in Tanzania is probably around 55 percent, more or less analogous to Nigeria. Both countries subscribe to secularism as a means of guaranteeing harmony between the communities in partners as states that would be ungovernable if one of the these communities were to dominate the others.

In Islamist propaganda, secularism is the supreme evil. Secularism rules out the application of Islam's traditional law, the shari'a. The Islamists demand introduction of the shari'a because it grants Muslems privileges as compared to non-Muslem citizens.

Although Sudan makes great strides toward becoming the major Islamist player in Africa, it lacks the resources and has not yet been able to match the long-standing and well-greased effort of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the late 1960's, Saudi Arabia intensified its financial support for Islamist parties all over. New institutions were created to make Islamism prevail. Secular members of the Saudi establishment as a means of thwarting the advance of communism. Over time, however, this policy developed a dynamism of its own, at times appearing contrary to the interests of the secular arm of the Saudi Government.

For instance, Sudan was to become the leading food supplier for the Arabian peninsula. This presupposes stability, something impossible under Islamist dictatorship. In order to enjoy stability, a population consisting of Moslems, Animists, and Christians requires a secular system of government. But Islamists choose Sudan to become a staging ground for their ideological conquest of Africa.

Iran operates chiefly on four levels. First, by mobilizing Shi'is among the Lebanese settled in most of West Africa and Indians in

East and South Africa. Hezbollah is a generic term referring to pro-Iranian that activists anywhere in the world. In West Africa, however, it is very much a Lebanese phenomenon. Most of the Lebanese settled there often since generations are Shi'is. The majority used to support the relatively moderate Lebanese Shi'i movement Amal. As in Lebanon, Iran used all its influence to make its will prevail over Amal with considerable success. Iran-trained Lebanese operators were sent to West Africa with money, propaganda material, and weapons.

Second, Iran tries to assume leadership of disaffected Sunni sections. In the case of Kenya's coastal people the Swahili, 17 percent are considered to be of Arab descent. Assuming leadership of a minority from among this minority, Shaikh Balala declared a Jihad against the government and threatened his opponents with death. At first sight this looks too ridiculous to warrant serious attention. The operation looked suicidal, pathological, but it served both the ends of Khartaum and Tehran who wished to punish Nairobi for its pro-American policies.

Third, Iran uses propaganda means on the pattern of China and the Soviet Union at the height of their ideological activity. This includes the establishment of Islamic centers, of new ones in places such as Daressalam and Freetown in Sierra Leone, the launching of newspapers and magazines or the support of already established ones, the creation of friendship societies and front organizations, et cetera. Islamists flood African Moslems with publications of all kinds, for young and old, for men and women.

Fourth, Iran uses front organizations and joint ventures with Lybia and Sudan. There is rivalry between Shi'i Iran and Sunni Sudan, but both countries subscribe to Islamism as a new category different from the Islam of the vast majority of Moslems.

An example of such cooperation was the opening of Sudanese Embassies in several West African States. Khartoum opened those embassies at the behest of Tehran with Iranian funding. Sudanese Embassies at that time aroused less suspicion than Iranian Embassies.

At the urging of North African neighbor states, those Iranian-Sudanese joined enterprises in West Africa had to close. In the meantime, the Sudanese regime has become so exposed that it is no longer useful as a camouflage for Iran. The effect of Islamist activities are all over a destructive force in Moslem societies.

In Kenya, the advent of Islamism has widened the cleavage between coastal people of Arab-Indian descent and non-Arab Moslems. The latter are organized in the pro-government United Moslems of Africa, Islamists in the Islamic Party of Kenya. They battle one another. The battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for Islamist and Moslem leadership is felt all around the world, but perhaps nowhere as virulently as in Africa.

The African battleground being much larger than, for example, Afghanistan, there is more variation to the Iranian-Saudi conflict. Saudi-sponsored Islamists have their own trinity of evil: "the missionary steamroller, the Zionist offensive, and Iranian expansionism."

Islamist activities, particularly of the Iranian-sponsored type, have been a disruptive force in society. They have considerably en-

dangered the relations between Christians and Moslems in Africa. And they pose a threat to development efforts as is evident from the propaganda unfolded against birth control and family planning programs. Although Iran itself subscribes now, after 10 years of refusal to birth control, Tehran's emissaries still unfold propaganda against family planning and other development measures whenever any such development measure is being conducted or is being sponsored or is being aided by the United States. It is basically a question of opposing Western and in particular American influences wherever they can. Thank you, very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Duran appears in the appendix.]

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Duran. Thank you to all the panelists. I had a question for all three of you regarding the funding for these groups and there are several questions all related to that. What is the source of funding for Islamic extremist groups in various countries, in the continent? And is there an international network of donors seeking to raise funds to support these groups? Also, what percentage of the funds do you believe come from supporters in the United States and then how is that money funneled over to those groups in Africa? Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. I think you have asked the $64,000 question. Actually, the groups that participate in such activities are generally low maintenance. They do not require a lot of money. Islamic fundamentalist groups are very efficient. They are not corrupt at all. There is an exceptional dedication to their cause. The World Trade Center bombing as an example of an extremist group acquiring funds cost less than $3,000. And I think it is that type of economic efficiency that allows them to spread their dollars very well around the world.

There is not only one source of funds. There are multiple sources. There are certain foundations and expatriates in the Persian Gulf that provide funds based in the Sudan, based in Saudi Arabia. Some of these groups are not sanctioned by the Saudi Government, but they exist because it is not illegal to operate those foundations. In the same manner, there are certain nontaxable foundations in the United States and that have actually received 501(c)(3) status that have been involved in funneling money to radical groups, including the World Trade Center bombing defendants. Again, that is not because the United States sanctions such activity, but because this is merely an expression of freedom in this country.

The moneys come from all over. There are many moneys raised in the United States. In fact, I would say to you in various periods over the last 6, 7 years. Hamas, Islamic, Jihad, the Gamaa in Egypt have received anywhere from 40, 50, 60, 65, 70 percent of their funds at different periods from moneys raised or generated in the United States. Some of those funds come into the United States, are laundered here and then go out. And other moneys are actually raised here. This country has been very helpful to many of those groups.

In the Philippines right now, the FBI is investigating the moneys that were in the possession of some of the defendants connected to Ramzi Yousef who was brought back a couple of months ago as the fugitive mastermind of the World Trade Center. Those moneys apparently came from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and from the United

States. So it is very difficult to get a handle on it. They do not file a 990. A non-profit tax return. They do not file an income tax return. And I suggest if they did, there would be plenty of fun for IRS auditors.

Having said that, the bottom line is even if the United States does restrict the flow of funds, and as you know in the Executive order that was promulgated recently has made it illegal to give money to Hamas and 17 other groups, they will still find ways of funding their movements.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Isaacson.

Mr. ISAACSON. If I can just add a couple of words. In our visit to Saudi Arabia last October, we met with a number of senior Saudi officials who talked with us about the steps the Saudi Government is taking, they told us, to control the kind of funds coming from private individuals in Saudi Arabia to fund extremist groups throughout the region.

They said that this is not money that comes from the Saudi Government itself. It comes from private individuals. They are trying to do what they can to crack down on it. Yet, when we spoke with people in North Africa, they clearly feel that money is coming to the region from the gulf.

Obviously, much of the money that goes to support extremism and that particularly goes to support terrorism is from those countries themselves. Algerian extremism is supported by Algerians. The degree to which there are funds coming from the United States that go into the support of Islamic extremism and the possibility of terrorism in North Africa, the Executive order issued by the President on January 24 will go to some length to stop that. Probably a good deal more needs to be done. I believe the legislation that is now being considered—in fact, the subject of a hearing in another committee this morning—may also help address that.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Duran.

Mr. DURAN. In Africa, over the last three decades we could observe a somewhat hilarious race between various parties as to who could fund more. I would not say that there is much secrecy about it. At first there was Lybia when it was still playing the Islamist card, trying to be no. 1 in funding Islamist groups and parties in various African countries and elsewhere outside of Africa, of course. Lybia was then overtaken by Saudi Arabia. It could not compete in the long run.

As for Saudi Arabian financing of Islamist groups and parties, I am talking about the Saudi Arabian Government. As far as donations by the royal family are concerned, they are very much on record. We only have to read the many publications brought out by institutions created by Saudi Arabia that constantly give us figures, even speak about donations made by his Majesty King Fahd to such-and-such mosque, in such-and-such place, and such-and-such Islamic center.

Some of the centers for which he donated only very recently are very extremist. It may not be always in the knowledge of the Saudi Arabia Government whom they are actually funding there, but they still continue officially to fund extremely radical groups in various countries. And all that is very much on record.

After Saudi Arabia overtook Lybia in this race, Saudi Arabia got overtaken by Iran. Iranian funding is not that open, not that official. It is not so much on record. The figures are not being published. But it is very easily observable that on the whole they have spent more money in Africa on Islamist activities than probably Lybia and Saudi Arabia together, despite Iran's economic difficulties. This is very easily provable in terms of publications they bring out, the Islamic centers they create, the masses of people they take to Iran for training, the masses of people they grant scholarships, even here in the United States. People in America study on Iranian-provided scholarships at American universities. The money that Iran has put into these activities is more than any of the other sources.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We have tracked the money. I would like to see if we have some answers at tracking the weapons involved in these groups. Where do these Islamic militant groups get their weapons, who are their primary providers and do we have any insight into the infrastructure responsible for funneling these arms to these groups, the sale, the transport, the distribution, the payment of these weapons? Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. I think we have to look at each group or conflict on a case-by-case basis. With regards to Algeria, there has definitely European intelligence, in particular the French, German, and British, have picked up and monitored a steady flow of weapons and explosives from Europe by GIA and FIS supporters and activists over the past 2 years.

I recommend a very, very interesting report that was released by German intelligence last December about the situation of the flow of activity, particularly weapons and explosives from Germany to the Middle East. It was a very startling portrait of what is going on.

In addition to which, British police recently rounded up in a series of raids a whole slew of weapons destined for Algeria. Sudan is considered a major transit point for weapons and for training. The Iranian Embassy in many countries is also used to transport explosives and/or weapons and it functions as a de facto arm for the terrorist mullahs who have injected terrorism as part of their foreign policy.

When I last saw you, Madam Chairwoman, I was returning from one of my talks in Argentina where I learned that the Iranian Embassy has been involved in supporting terrorist groups in Buenos Aires and its Embassy has been used for also funneling weapons and explosives. This goes on, not just in Buenos Aires, of course, but around the world.

Hamas has received many weapons in the West Bank in Gaza. It has received weapons from a variety of sources ranging from stolen weapons from Israeli military bases and some Israeli arms dealers. But by and large the weapons are smuggled from Lebanon, from Egypt, and Jordan. I would also say to you right now that in Gaza there is a potential of that becoming a new Lebanon considering the amount, the vast amount of weapons, explosives that have flowed in the last 15 months. The amount is so extraordinary that I do not even believe if Yassir Arafat ever wanted to crack down

he could ever confiscate and acquire the control over all those groups.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Emerson, I think we will leave it at that. I know you have something to say, but I would like to recognize Mr. Hastings who has been so patient. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.

Mr. HASTINGS. Well, I had a problem, Madam Chair. This is extremely worthwhile and I appreciate so very much all of the witnesses. It is very enlightening. To the extent that I could, I read ahead of your testimonies. And each of you are brilliant in the subject matter and I compliment you.

Regarding the flow of money and even arms, it is my view, and I just offer it not for response, but it is my view that people with a cause will find a way. And I know that from my personal activities in the civil rights days, I fought the battle of desegregation against the school system in my community. And over a 7-year period of time, I was paid $750 and my opposition was paid $1,750,000 and I won. So you will find a way. Missionaries and monks on the African continent, particularly missionaries, were in pauper status, but they managed to convey the messages that they were about and that seems to be the case.

What I think we may be missing that all of you know so well and that is these kinds of movements are rock solid in their base and as you put it, Mr. Emerson, low maintenance and are fueled by people power, more than by money. And that is how they get over.

I would like if you would for Mr. Isaacson, you and Mr. Emerson, if you would give me a snapshot recognizing time of present U.S. policy and whether or not you feel it is effective. And Mr. Duran, my question to you would be for you to give us again your capsule view as to how best the United States can ameliorate the developing problems of extremism in Africa. And I do not mean, nor do I suggest that you should be so presumptuous, but believe it or not, all of us really need information and many times do not know what we are doing and certainly do not know as well as those who have been there. And I leave it to you gentlemen as you see fit.

Mr. ISAACSON. That is a tall order, Congressman. I will just make a couple of quick points. I believe that the United States has been successfully engaged and must continue to be engaged in the pursuit of economic development throughout the region, in the pursuit of political reform throughout the region, in the pursuit of bilateral relations with each of these countries where we share common interests in stability and security in the region.

Some of this goes forward through the foreign aid program. I omitted from my remarks this morning, in abridging them, that the United States must continue to support aid to Africa, must continue to support the foreign aid program generally. It is one of our better bulwarks, I think, against the slippage into poverty and into other conditions that constitute a breeding ground for extremism. So the aid program must continue.

There are other parts of that. The World Bank is very successfully involved in economic development and in social programs in many of these countries. So, too, the IMF and other multilateral institutions.

The United States must continue to be engaged in the peace process in the Middle East. We have been the principal coordinator of that process, the catalyst of that process. By bringing about greater reconciliation and by reducing the climate of tension and the arms race in that region we can also contribute. I will just stop there.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Emerson.

Mr. EMERSON. I think in looking at an answer, I would say that there are so many multiple components and just isolate them. There is the issue of containing terrorism, both domestically and internationally and there is the issue about how do we deal with militant political Islam.

As far as terrorism is concerned, I think that the counterterrorism legislation that has been submitted was a direct response to the recognition that this country has a severe problem with many of the radical groups operating here extensively and with total impunity in terms of raising money, training, acquiring weapons, and plotting potential future terrorist acts and/or certainly remotely controlling activities, operations that is, in their indigenous countries.

I think there is an issue internationally. How do we contain terrorism? Or do these groups have an amorphous ability to go in and out of countries. It is very hard to track them. The United States has found it in an exceptionally difficult position of tracking who comes into this country.

I can tell you from my own discussions with senior law enforcement officials there are major leaders of various radical groups in the Middle East that have come into the United States in the last 4 months and U.S. authorities were totally unaware of their presence until after they left this country. So I think obviously some type of recognition and rectification of that problem is required.

As far as the political component is concerned, I do not have an answer. I think ultimately it is within Islam that we have to look for an answer for moderates to emerge. One of the tragic aspects I guess is that Islam seems to be mired in the same vortex of radical debate that it was mired 1,000 years ago. And you have modernists and secularists and reform-minded people pitted against the militants and the revivalists. And one of the reasons that has occurred is there really has not been a reformation in Islam. There has not been a St. Augustine if you will.

So I think there is no way that the West can impose that type of doctrinal reformation. It has to come from within Islam, but I think the West can be very supportive of modern Islamic movements and modern Islamic groups that are really at the core of trying to give legitimacy to those groups that basically repudiate violence as a means of solving conflict.

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Duran.

Mr. DURAN. I would like to link this question up with the question about the arms. The first concrete aspect here is when Afghanistan was taken over by the Mujahidin, it was a situation very similar to that of Vietnam after the American withdrawal. Afghanistan was a huge stockpile of weapons, both Russian supplied and American supplied.

Now, much of those weapons have then been sent to Sudan with Iranian help. Most of the weapons for African Islamic insurgencies come through Sudan via Iran. Iran can always say that they are not coming from Iran because it is mainly Iraq that has sent weapons and oil. Those materials go through Iran and it ends up like by the Iranians to Sudan and from Sudan into other African countries. Iran claims that they are not doing anything over there, but in actual fact they are the main suppliers. So here direct action can be taken.

The other thing is on a political level, most Americans seem to be unaware, even many of the decisionmakers, what people in the region believe about American policy. I always see that people here in Washington are kind of wonder-struck by what the majority of Moslems in the world firmly believe. Many, many intellectuals are fully convinced, that much of this Islamism is an American creation. It is a kind of a ploy. It is a conspiracy against the Moslem world to keep the region backward because there is nothing as effective as to bring Islamists to power. That throws countries back 50 years, 100 years, as in the case of Iran. Nobody can say exactly how many years Iran has been thrown back. It is an enormous throwback that has occurred in Iran as a result of Islamists having come to power.

There is a widespread belief that that was American doing. All this talk here in Washington such as, "if we want democracy we have to let the Islamists come to power"; that is very supportive. Because they do not have a majority. It is wrong to say that there were elections in Algeria and they won. They did not win the elections. They did not have a majority at all in Algeria. What they have is a bare 20 percent. That is the highest that they would be able to get in national elections.

Mr. HASTINGS. That is sort of like Republicans here. They only got 20 percent.

Mr. DURAN. I have heard this argument 100 times, but it is a very different situation over there. They do not have a majority anywhere, they would not get it. In free and fair elections they would not come to power in any country. So statements like, "We as Americans support democracy, we have to give them a chance, we have to let them come to power," people misunderstand that in Algeria and in the rest of the Moslem world. They think, "Oh, Americans want those people to come to power. They are behind this whole thing." It is very discouraging to those who resist this type of Islamism. I did not want to use this word, but in the region people speak of Islamism as fascism.

Mr. HASTINGS. I am sorry, Mr. Isaacson. Go right ahead.

Mr. ISAACSON. Let me just add very quickly I would like to identify myself with the statements by Professor Duran about the danger posed by Iran and the need for the United States to press onward with its containment policy, to make more effective its containment policy of Iran. That is another point of U.S. policy that Congress has something to do with.

Mr. HASTINGS. Let me just change directions because I do have such expertise before me for the moment and ask as it relates to this particular problem, do either of you have an opinion regarding the effectiveness of actions at the United Nations and coupled with

that the effectiveness if at all of the Organization of African Unity or any other regional organization in Africa dealing with this particular problem? Or is it as I perceive, for example, at the OAU, a matter on the backburner. And I do not understand the dynamics of that. Can either of you comment and help me in that regard?

Mr. DURAN. Well, I think it is obvious that Sudan is the major troublemaker in Africa today. A lot of the neighboring African states would probably be very grateful if they were assisted in their resistance to Sudanese interference. Eritrea, as I mentioned, has appealed several times to the United Nations. American policy could be more supportive of those appeals and make this a bigger issue. The same I think would apply to Uganda. Uganda will certainly be very much relieved if that pressure were taken off it. Uganda at the moment is not in a position really to take on Sudan which has been so heavily armed because of this Iraqi-Iranian element.

Mr. HASTINGS. Is the United Nations responding?

Mr. EMERSON. I think the United Nations is not responding because it reflects the constituency of its members. I mean, I note somewhat ironically that several of the World Trace Center defendants had ties to Sudanese diplomatic mission people. And I can tell you based on my other discussions with law enforcement authorities, there is a problem in New York and leave it at that. And I think the United Nations reflects the makeup of its radical members as well as its moderate members. And therefore, the lowest common denominator applies and basically nothing will get done.

Mr. ISAACSON. There have been multilateral efforts to contain this problem, particularly as it relates to terrorism, less as it relates to political Islam, I believe. The G7 has a counter-terrorism group that is working on that component of this larger problem. But I am not sure that the United Nations is the proper address. Maybe in an ideal world, but I do not think it has been to this point. I am less familiar with the OAU's involvement in it.

Mr. HASTINGS. I thank you all so very much. And Madam Chair, I beg your leave. I am overdue.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Hastings. Let me just ask one more question of the panelists. In recognition of the grave security risks imposed by these Islamic extremist groups, an organization as renowned as NATO decided in February of this year to begin discussions with moderate North African and Middle Eastern States in order to develop a strategy to counter this growing threat.

In your opinion, what role did the United States NATO delegation play in this initiative? Was the United States a proponent, a supporter, a critic? And what do you believe has been accomplished thus far? Have any recommendations been issued? If so, what are they and what direction do you suggest that they should in fact be moving toward?

Mr. EMERSON. I think you are correct in saying that there have been, there has been movement within NATO in trying to enlist the support of moderate Arab regimes in trying to contain this threat. Unfortunately, there has been some resistance and threats of retaliation from some of the more radical regimes.

I would like to, I think, state on the record that this problem is compounded by something else, probably compounded by what we experience here in the United States which is that the issue is shrouded in sensitivity. And the problem is that there are many groups that have a very supportive role in promoting radicalism that have taken an organizational leadership in the United States and elsewhere and they are trying to set the agenda or change the agenda.

And I have no doubt that this hearing itself will be viciously condemned as an attack on Islam, that this will be portrayed as part of the Western conspiracy, that my presence as well as the presence of the other witnesses here will be portrayed as part of this western Zionist plot against Islam which it is not, but it will be portrayed as such.

The radical groups' publications, literature, and newspapers in this country which unfortunately will affect the perception of many Moslems who do not have an independent way of ascertaining what is really going on. And I think that tragedy as I see it is that there really is a stranglehold on the information being flowed, that flows into the rank and file Moslems in the United States and elsewhere.

I do not see the stranglehold as much in the Arab Moslem world as I do in the United States ironically. And I can only state that it is my prediction that you unfortunately will be subjected to many critical attacks for holding this hearing. I commend you for holding it. I think moderate Moslems all around the United States, around the world, appreciate it.

From a personal level, I can tell you just in brief after the showing of "Jihad in America", I was attacked roundly by radical groups here in the United States. In fact, what the film showed was the extraordinary hatred and racism of these radical groups, but that issue was inverted and unfortunately many Moslems could only see that perception as reflected by their leadership. But privately I have been contacted by an extraordinary number of moderate Moslems who have told me to continue, who have helped me. And I believe that issue of supporting the moderate Islam is the key for the foreseeable future in confronting this problem.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Emerson. Mr. Isaacson.

Mr. ISAACSON. Madam Chairwoman, when you discuss the NATO involvement in this, the NATO perspective on this problem, I believe it is perceived within NATO that North Africa is the southern flank of Europe, and therefore there is justifiable, enormous concern about the threat of Islamic extremism there. My testimony, in a section which I did not read, also spoke about the potential migration problems and other difficulties that could arise in Europe if extremists seized power in some of these states.

As North Africa is the southern flank of Europe, it is also the western flank of the Middle East in a sense. And there is a good deal of spillover back and forth politically in terms of funding as we have discussed, in terms of arms as we have discussed, in terms of ideology as we have discussed.

I commend you for bringing the focus of the committee to this issue, in handling this issue in a way that I think the public is only now beginning to comprehend in its enormous seriousness, its potential threat to the United States, to our interests overseas, to the

interests of our allies. And that is, if we can just stay focused on the need to support economic development and political reform in that region, and to support the peace process, and to support containment of threats to moderate regimes—internal as well as external threats—I think that this hearing will have advanced that cause in a very constructive way. Thank you.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Duran.

Mr. DURAN. Madam Chairwoman, NATO has messed up the whole thing in Bosnia. No single issue has had such a terrible effect on the growth of Islamism all over the world as the betrayal of Bosnia as a country with a Moslem majority. It is not 44 percent. It is 54 percent. The Moslem majority is largely secularist. The Moslem majority there does not want to have an Islamist state later on, not even a Moslem state, just a state for all Bosnians regardless of their religion. A state that should serve as an example for the three religious communities, Jews, Christians, and Moslems to be their common homeland.

The fact that this country has been left alone, has been allowed to be butchered so mercilessly, that is the biggest propaganda boon for Islamists all over the world, in every village in Africa and Asia, anywhere you go. You go to Buenos Aires, you can mobilize people into Hezbollah by pointing to Bosnia.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. We appreciate all of you being here today. We thank the audience as well for being with us. So we hope to have another set of hearings as we further examine this issue. We hope to have that in June and I hope that we will be hearing from other people with other views and people who share similar views as the panelists here today. But this is not an issue that is going to go away, an issue which the United States has a real vital national security interest in making sure that these extremist groups are no longer on any continent because they pose a threat to the security of our Nation and for the future generations of our great country. So thank you all for being here today and the subcommittee is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

HEARING ON THE

"THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA"

OPENING REMARKS OF

THE HONORABLE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN

CHAIRPERSON

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

April 6, 1995

10:00 a.m., Room 2172 Rayburn Building

I must admit that it was not an easy task trying to find a name for this hearing which accurately reflected the issues we hope to address here today -- terrorism and insurgency. We rejected the term "Islamic fundamentalism" because believing and practicing one's religion -- be it Islam, Christianity, or Judaism -- is a trait that I personally admire. I firmly believe that the world needs more people who genuinely live according to their religious convictions.

Our use of the term "Islamic extremism" stems from our recognition of this fact -- Islam, as a religion, is a positive influence on society and not our enemy.

There have always been Islamic "fundamentalists" who have preached rigorous conformity to what the Koran dictates. These traditionalists are concerned with personal ethics and spirituality, and firmly believe in the ideals of brotherhood and unity. They follow the "straight path" -- or God's laws as revealed to Mohammed -- not just for their own salvation but for the good of the entire Muslim community.

This concept of community is an essential component of Islam.

Moderate Islamic organizations interpret this idea as their obligation to reform their societies and political systems to conform to the values set forth in the Koran. The focus of their efforts is usually the reform of personal behavior and of the domestic socio-economic scenario -- all noble endeavors.

To reiterate, Islam and true, legitimate Muslim fundamentalists are not the cause of our concern.

We are here to discuss those groups which unequivocably pose a security threat to the U.S. and to the world community. We are here to discuss the actions of those who distort the concept of a "Muslim brotherhood", invoke God's name in vain, and utilize the Koran to justify their acts of terrorism.

Whether from religious or secular motivations, those who seek to impose their will through violence and terror must be stopped.

These are the ones we oppose. These are the ones we must protect ourselves from. This is the focus of our hearing.

Islamic militancy has emerged as one of the most serious threats to Western security. It has increased intraregional tensions and is forging new unholy alliances over the challenge posed by it.

While the perception of Islamic extremism as exclusively a Middle Eastern problem lives on, thousands of African Islamic militants are being trained in making bombs, throwing hand grenades, and shooting assault weapons. In the more exclusive training camps, veterans of the Afghan war are providing advanced military training in the operation of anti-aircraft weapons and tanks.

In Algeria, terrorists assassinate feminists, journalists, and secular intellectuals in the streets, with the number of deaths totalling over 40,000. Their objective is to overthrow the military government which, they claim, cheated an Islamic political party of its victory at the polls three years ago. If this goal is achieved, this new fanatical dictatorial regime will help feed xenophobia in relation to the outside world and will quench any progress for international relations.

The crisis in Algeria, however, is but a microcosm of a larger problem. There are many U.S. policy makers, specifically at the State Department, who emphasize that Islamic extremism is too diffuse and varied to be called a movement -- that it lacks one leader and one agenda.

They must not be listening to the statements made by these Islamic militant groups. They may not answer to a single individual. However, they do have a common theme, a cause which drives them to take any risk necessary to achieve their end. They belief that frontiers could never divide Muslims because they are one nation; they will always remain a single entity. They are sworn to fight the Great Satan America for the global supremacy of Islam.

In this context, it is clear that Islamic extremist and militant groups pose a direct threat to regional stability, to the fragile democracies of the African continent, and to U.S. security interests. They overtly challenge U.S. leadership and that of its allies by making them primary targets of their hatred and hostility.

For those who state that this is not an international problem, that the U.S. is beyond the reach of these terrorist groups, I can only respond by saying: remember New York! Remember the World Trade Center! For those who reiterate that this is not a problem in Africa, I can only remind them that a majority of the defendants in the New York bombings are from African countries.

And now it is a pleasure to introduce the members of our distinguished panel.

Our first speaker is Steven Emerson who has been named by the New York Post "the nation's foremost journalistic expert on terrorism." He was recently named the recipient of the George Polk Award, one of the nation's most prestigious journalism honors, for his PBS documentary "Jihad in America." Previously, he worked as an investigative correspondent for CNN and as a senior editor for U.S. News and World Report. Mr. Emerson has received numerous accolades for his investigative reporting. He is the author and co-author of several books dealing with terrorism. Currently, he is working on a new documentary series and a book on the issue of radical Islamic movements in America.

He will be followed by Jason Isaacson who is the Director of Government and International Affairs for the American Jewish Committee. During his tenure at the Committee, he has served as an observer in 1991 and 1992 at the Middle East peace talks in Madrid, Moscow, and Washington. He also represented the Committee at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna. Previously, Mr. Isaacson served as Chief of Staff and as Press Secretary to Senator Christopher J. Dodd, and as Press Secretary to

90-834 O - 95 - 3

then-Representative Ratchford of Connecticut. He is a journalist by trade and founder of Independent News Service, a Washington-based syndicate.

The last member of the panel is Khalid Duran. Dr. Duran is currently a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Studies and Editor of TransState Islam. Since 1986, he has served as a Visiting Professor of Islamic Studies at various universities throughout the United States. He has also taught several courses on Islamic Culture and Islamic Mysticism at the Smithsonian Institution and served as a Researcher at the institute of Iranian Studies at Freie Universitat Berlin. Furthermore, he has lectured on this issue at universities in Scandinavia, France, Italy, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Egypt. He has authored several books and is a frequent contributor to major European newspapers and academic journals, as well as magazines of major European political foundations.

I would like to welcome all of you and thank you for being here today.

THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
APRIL 6, 1995 -- 10 AM -- 2200 RHOB
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. PAYNE

Thank you Madam Chairperson, Islam is a major religion in Africa, and I want to congratulate you on your sensitivity in the selection of today's subject. The title does not indicate that Islam is a threat, but only extremism is. I believe you have chosen wisely because there are those who would like to replace the threat of the Cold War or the "Red Threat" with the "Green Threat". This unfortunately connotates that all Muslims are a threat. I feel that this is far from the actual situation as we look world-wide.

According to the Overseas Development Council here in Washington, there are approximately 924 million Muslims around the world, representing 18 percent of the world's population. Although Islam is associated mainly with the Middle East, more than 70 of the world's 184 countries are considered members of the Dar al Islam, or house of Islam. Islam is a major religion in such African countries as Algeria, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leon, Somalia and Tunisia; and to a lesser degree in Benin, Bukina, Camerooon, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya and Nigeria.

In my understanding of the Islamic faith, there is nothing in their religion that opposes democracy. Islamic faith embodies the recourse to Shura (meaning consultation) as a principle governing relations between the political authority and the people. In democracy the instruments of elections, parliamentary systems and the separation of powers, would seem to implement the Shura.

However, Islamic political movements are not monolithic in nature. Some Muslims believe that Islam is an all-inclusive code that guides political, social, and economic action; more extreme Muslims, reject social change, and democratic principles. Scholars point out that the rage and violence associated with Muslim extremists are not a reflection of Islamic law or values, but are instead an expression of religious radicalism, ultra-nationalism, and feelings of economic and social disenfranchisement.

These points are illustrated by the situation in both Algeria and Saudia Arabia. In Algeria a military government canceled a democratic election in fear of loosing to an Islamic Party that was successful in local elections, thus turning the country to the present state of civil war. On the other hand although the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia is considered one of the most orthodox Islamic regimes in the world, it is also an ally to the United States, a foremost critic of Islamic radicalism or extremism. So we have a very complex subject to discuss this morning Madam Chairperson, and I hope our panel is well balanced to present this sensitive subject.

Thank you.

"Militant Islam and the West"

Testimony of Steven Emerson

Introduction

I thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to speak on Islamic fundamentalism. This is a subject that is fast becoming the most important, captivating, wrenching and dramatic geopolitical story not just of the present but of the next century. For what we are witnessing is a true life drama being played out throughout the world with life and death consequences for entire nations and peoples.

By way of background, I am an author, journalist, documentarian and specialist in the areas of terrorism and the Middle East. I am the author of four books dealing with U.S. national security and the Middle East, have written extensively for national publications and newspapers during the past 15 years, and have served in various journalist positions, including as a correspondent for U.S. News and World Report and later for CNN.

For the last two years, my field of specialty has been radical Islamic extremist networks around the world, and in particular, their links in and throughout the United States. This investigation has taken me to more than 25 foreign countries as well as to more than 200 American cities, municipalities, and communities. Together with my colleagues, I have collected more than 150,000 documents, records, videos, tapes, manuscripts and publications, and reports dealing with the issue of radical Islamic fundamentalism, constituting probably one of the largest archives of primary radical Islamic intelligence material anywhere in the West. These documents include such things as tens of thousands of telephone toll records of the World Trade Center defendants, internal Hamas reports, maps of Sudanese terrorist training camps, hundreds of hours of videos of clandestine radical Islamic terrorist conferences and recruitment sessions (many taking place in the U.S. unbeknownst to U.S. law enforcement authorities), and thousands of original Islamic terrorist manuals and missives.

During the past two years, I, together with several colleagues, have conducted hundreds of interviews with officials in U.S., European and Middle Eastern law enforcement and intelligence. Perhaps, ever more important, have been the more than 700 interviews conducted with Muslim citizens (both secularist and religious), Islamic militants and radical fundamentalists, mujahideen leaders and terrorist chieftains in North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States. I have been to more than two dozen radical Muslim conferences, held abroad and in the United States.

Last November, in the first of a series of journalistic projects resulting from my investigation, I served as the executive producer and correspondent for a PBS documentary entitled "Jihad in America." The film documented the hitherto unknown infrastructure of radical Islamic networks on American soil featuring leaders of the most militant movements in the world today, including leaders of Hamas, Hiz'b al-Tahrir (the Islamic Liberation Party), Sudanese National Islamic Front, Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya and others.

A Conflict Without Borders

The broad emergence of militant Islamic fundamentalism can be considered an extension of the struggle for the heart and soul of Islam, a faith that is the most vibrant, fascinating and energetic religion in the world today. Yet, Islam is currently being wrenched by existential confrontations pitting modernists versus fundamentalists and secularists versus militants in a duel-to-the-death challenge over mankind's most primal

competition -- to determine whose God will reign supreme, which is only a guise to a more worldly competition of whose state will reign supreme.

At the very outset of my statement, I would like to state that militant Islamic fundamentalism is not synonymous with Islam the religion. The vast overwhelming majority of the world's more than one billion Muslims do not condone violence or militancy. It is only a small minority of Muslims that are militant. Moreover, throughout its history, Islam has expressed itself in a wide variety of trends -- from a pragmatic and tolerant inward-looking approach to a militant one. Therefore it is vitally important to point out that contemporary Islamic groups that claim to represent pure fundamental theological doctrine of Islam are merely a modern totalitarian interpretation of Islamic theology.

The issue facing the West today is not whether to "declare war on Islam" as some U.S. academics and fundamentalist spokesmen have characterized the debate over U.S policy; rather the issue is whether the U.S. will recognize that what fuels violence and extremism is the militant's interpretation of Islam. And understanding the militants' interpretation of Islam -- unhindered by the prism of our liberal Judeo-Christian values or the deliberate obfuscation by militants preying upon western naiveté -- is the only way U.S. policy makers and the public will ever be able to arrive at an effective and viable means of dealing with this dilemma.

My film, "Jihad in America," represented only a snapshot of a far more extensive phenomenon in the U.S.: the increasing support networks of radical Islamic fundamentalists within the United States dedicated to advancing extremist goals and militant agendas; as a deliberate corollary, the militants' objectives also include the destruction of any embryonic roots of Islamic secularism and reformism in the United States. Radical Islamic networks now constitute the primary domestic -- as well as international-national security threat facing the FBI and other law enforcement agencies.

On a more visceral level, the documentary showed beyond any doubt the true, yet often hidden agenda of Islamic militants. In contrast to the wholly disingenuous statements of Islamic radical propagandists -- several of whom are in this hearing room today and who tried last November to suppress broadcast of my film -- the documentary showed the unvarnished and unfiltered views of the world's senior radical Islamic fundamentalist theologians and military leaders. Their views express an unmitigated rejection of the West and its systems of secularism, pluralism, democracy and the separation of church and State, as well as unremitting hatred of Jews, Christians and moderate Muslims or anything or institution that is perceived to be a surrogate of the West.

Finally and perhaps most important, and relevant to today's hearing, is the fact that the film showed that radical Islamic fundamentalism has become such a widespread development that it cannot be delineated anymore by conventional geographical or national boundaries. Although there is no evidence that any type of pyramidal Islamic fundamentalist hierarchy exits, such as with the old style comintern or politburo structures, the myriad Islamic fundamentalist movements share a basic common agenda in promoting the resurrection of doctrinal early 7th and 8th century Islam. Although there is no formal collaborative structure, the groups that exist under the Islamic fundamentalist umbrella often collaborate on an ad hoc basis, sharing resources, such as support networks, money, da'wa (or Islamic missionary propaganda), recruitment, military training, and even weapons acquisition.

Front Groups' Efforts to Legitimize Militancy

Nowadays, radical Islamic fundamentalist spokesmen attuned to the negative connotations of the term "fundamentalism" shrewdly try to avoid using the term. Some Islamic groups in the Washington area go further: they actually assert that the mere use of the term "fundamentalist" is "racist" and "biased" against Muslims and that any discussion of radical Islamic movements is inherently "racist." In point of fact, the group leading this intimidation campaign against anyone who criticizes the militants is a Washington headquartered organization called the Council on American Islamic Relations, known as CAIR.

In fact, CAIR, according to federal law enforcement sources and internal documents, is a radical Islamic fundamentalist front group for Hamas. The executive director of CAIR, Nihad Awad, served for several years as a senior official of the Hamas support group in Texas called the Islamic Association for Palestine. That group has been designated by federal law enforcement as one of Hamas' headquarters in the United States today and has been involved in promoting Hamas terrorism. CAIR, the stepchild of the Islamic Association for Palestine, was created in 1993 from radical Islamic fundamentalist "donations," including moneys believed to have come from traditional sources of Hamas funding. In Washington, CAIR, besides rationalizing Hamas terrorist attacks and criticizing negotiations with the "Zionist" entity, has hosted, sponsored or arranged visits and press conferences of leading Islamic fundamentalist militant officials from the Sudan, Malaysia and Jordan, who have articulated rabidly anti-Semitic and anti-Christian views. One visiting Islamic fundamentalist leader from Jordan, who CAIR hosted in Washington last year and arranged to meet staffers from the Senate and State Department, is on record in a speech to fellow radical fundamentalists here in the U.S. as encouraging Islamic militants to kill any Jew they see in Jordan.

It is important that this Subcommittee make fully aware to the American public, and in particular the Muslim public, that CAIR and other groups like it have a hidden agenda in promoting a radical vision of Islam that has nothing to do with the essence of Islam. The purpose of groups like CAIR is to legitimize the activities of Islamic militants and to neutralize opposition to Islamic extremism.

Seif Ashmawi, the Egyptian-born U.S. publisher of the Voice of Peace and an opponent of radical Islamic fundamentalism, told me in an interview: ***"Groups like CAIR do not really represent Islam or American Muslims; they only claim to represent them. In reality, these groups represent only extremists. Yet no one seems willing to challenge them, to demand who funds them, to force them to reveal their true militant beliefs and their political connections to radical terrorist groups. Perhaps because we Muslims are such a new community in the United States, you cannot expect us to fight it out publicly; but what surprises me is how gullible the American media and government are. How can you blindly accept their statements? If you cannot detect an extremist group in your backyard, how can you ever hope to contain extremists in the Middle East?"***

Mr. Ashmawi's comments are important for this Subcommittee to ponder. His point about deception is one that goes to the heart of understanding the authentic agenda of the militants.

The West and the Tenets of Military Islamic Fundamentalism

Militant Islamic fundamentalists seek to impose doctrinal early 7th and 8th

century Islam (the earliest formative era) -- as revealed by Allah to the Prophet Mohammed and contained in the Islamic Holy Book called the Qu'ran -- to contemporary life. For these fundamentalists, original Islam must be reinstituted throughout the Muslim and non-Muslim world regardless of the circumstances of the modern world or the evolutionary changes in Islam that have occurred in its 1400 year old history. Although there are some fundamentalists who accept the notion of pluralism and accommodate changes in history, militant fundamentalists categorically reject the notion of religious diversity.

In contemporary Islamic 20th century history, the failure of Arab nationalism, corruption of Arab elites and the repression of authoritarian regimes increasingly drove the masses into embracing Islam as a refuge and a source of comfort. Because secularism had been imposed from above by illegitimate authoritarian modern regimes, the public and intelligentsia overwhelmingly rejected it. (In the West, the opposite occurred, as secularism became a mass movement; religion was rejected because it was identified with the ruling elites.) The final -- and perhaps most important factor -- in perpetuating the legitimacy of militant Islam has been the absence of a religious "reformation" in Islam unlike the experience of Catholicism (St. Augustine) and the Protestant Church (Luther). One of the major problems faced by Muslim reformers is that their brand of moderate Islam is categorically rejected by leading traditional Islamic theologians.

The West is not prepared to meet this threat. Modern democracies are unwilling to engage in the type of conflict that characterized religious wars of previous ages. Nor should they. The failure to perceive the nature of the conflict stems from the Western tendency to apply a Judeo-Christian frame of reference to Islam. A faulty application. Christianity and Judaism, in their history, have undergone reformation, separating church from state and giving up the use of violence in the name of God.

Militant fundamentalist Islam, by contrast, has not yet undergone the same historical evolution. In militant Islam, there is no separation between mosque and state -- between the realms of the sacred and the secular -- between religion and politics. Rather, they are all one and the same. Which means in practice that the militant Islamic cleric is also a political and military leader, and his mosque may serve as a venue for violent Jihad activities.

Observing militant Islam in far away Afghanistan or in the Middle East, citizens of democracies do recognize the role of religion in the conflict. But when they view the same phenomenon within their own society, bound by their Western democratic values and morals, as well as by their legal principles, they fail to understand the crux of the problem: **Any religion, when abused by militant fundamentalists, may serve not only as a source, but as an organizational framework for violence and aggression in the name of God. This was the case with the aberrant Jewish militant groups that have engaged in violence over the past few years, with the Branch-Davidian Christian fundamentalist cult, and with the militant anti-abortion activists. This is also the case with the more popular militant Islamic movements.**

To some observers, Islamic fundamentalism appears as a religious phenomenon insofar as it demands the restoration of the fundamentals of faith. But in fact it is an all encompassing political movement as well, demanding: **(1) the re-creation of the Muslim Empire known as the Khilafa; (2) the absolute rejection of western systems and**

values such as capitalism, Marxism, democracy and separation of church and state; (3) the reimposition of the old social order and religious order in accordance with the Shari'ah (Islamic law) in which second-class citizenship would be formalized for women and non-Muslims; and (4) unalterable rejection of the West.

For politically-shrewd fundamentalist spokespeople, the manifestation of Islamic extremist movements is explained away as simply reaction to Israeli and Arab repression. The reality is that Islamists articulated their rage at the West before the Jewish state was established. Then, as now, they viewed central principles of American society as anti-Islamic. Egyptian Muslim fundamentalist ideologue Sayid Qutb, recognized as an architect of "Islamic revivalism" wrote a piece about the West in the Egyptian cultural magazine, Al-Risala, in October 1946: *"...All these Westerners are the same: a rotten conscience, a false civilization...How I hate these westerners, how I despise all of them without exception."* Qutb later visited the U.S., which only re-affirmed his hatred of western culture as well as his racism: *"[The American's] favorite music is Jazz, "* Qutb wrote in 1951. *"This is the kind of music the Negroes invented to satisfy their primitive inclinations...it rouses their animal instincts..."*

The Growth of Militant Islam

During the past 16 years, radical Islamic fundamentalist movements have proliferated beyond the local regions and cities where they have been simmering since the 1940's. From their base in the Middle East, these movements have spread into surrounding countries and continents, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Sudan and Nigeria, as well as into the U.S., Europe and large parts of the former Soviet Union.

Although portrayed in the media as a force that has developed in response to widespread poverty, repression and corruption in the Middle East, the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism is a far more complex phenomenon whose origins and agenda transcend these temporal conditions. Islam itself has 72 fiercely independent sects.

Among some Islamic fundamentalists, there are differences of opinion. Some fundamentalist groups, like Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood have been represented by "legitimate" political parties within their countries. Other groups like the Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hiz'b al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) in Jordan and the FIS in Algeria have opted to field representatives for their respective parliaments while continuing to carry out violent political intimidation in pursuit of their Islamist agenda. Yet still, there is another variety of Islamic fundamentalists, such as the underground Gamaa Islamiya in Egypt and the Palestinian Hamas, who eschew all official political participation as religiously illegal. Their political strategy consists of winning over the hearts and minds of Muslims at the street level and simultaneously waging holy war against the "infidels."

Yet, in the end, the bottom line shared by all militant fundamentalists regardless of their diversity is the centrality of Islam in serving as an all-encompassing way of life; its adherents seek to enforce the rule of the Shari'ah, which according to their own official proclamations, rejects secular systems and culture as well as any political entity perceived as a "surrogate" of the West.

The tenets of militant Islamic fundamentalism require adherence not only to a strict religious lifestyle, but provide "Islamic" views on politics, economics, social behavior, personal conduct and nearly everything else in daily life. Some militant Islamic fundamentalists openly demand confrontation with any non-Muslim or secular system until it is superseded or replaced. Others state that they are willing to accept the West if the West "accepts and respects" Islam.

From the Western perspective, the Islamist agenda has provoked a major debate. Can those who claim--such as the FIS in Algeria--that they are committed to "democracy" be trusted once they acquire power? Or are they simply manipulating the system in order to take over and impose their Islamist views on everyone else in society? Is the answer simply to allow Islamists to take office and let them face the wrath of an angry population if they are not responsive to the needs of the people?

Although there are no simple answers to these questions, the fact remains that the common denominator among all radical Islamic fundamentalist movements is that they draw no dividing line between the realms of the sacred and the secular, between politics and religion, between church and state--the basic principles of Western culture and modern life. Radical Islamic fundamentalists see the West as a threat to Islam and as part of ongoing international conspiracy stretching back to the Crusades to subjugate and repress Islam.

The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 was a deliberate act of political violence, motivated by an ideology that justified such violence as a necessary response to "Western imperialism" and "aggression" against Islam. Fundamentalist literature and dogma is replete with calls to overthrow the West. **Last year, at a conference at Wembley Arena in London, more than 9000 Muslim militants demanded "death to Jews" and an end to the "evils" of British government, democracy and "western conspiracies."** In December 1992, Kamal Helbawi, a militant Islamic leader originally from Egypt and now based out of Pakistan had the following to say to a crowd of 3000 fundamentalists in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma:

"O' Brothers, the Palestine cause is not a conflict of borders and land only. It is not even a conflict over human ideology. And not over peace. Rather it is an absolute clash of civilizations, between truth and falsehood, between two conducts: One Satanic, headed by Jews and their conspirators--and the other religious, carried by Hamas, the Islamic people in general and the Islamic movement in particular."

Fundamentalist leaders proudly proclaim--and they do not exaggerate--that Islam is the fastest growing religion in the world including the West. Fundamentalists have been particularly successful in recruiting among the new generations of disaffected and impoverished Muslim youth.

The Muslim population of the world today stands at more than one billion--the largest of any religious groups. In many parts of Africa, Asia and the former Soviet republics, Islam has established itself as the official state religion; in various western countries, such as France and England, Islam is the second largest religion. When this demographic phenomenon is added to the mix of political alienation, and socio-economic deprivation, the result is a dangerously combustible mixture that can ignite at any time.

To be sure, the resentment and hatred of the West is not rooted in an entirely mythical plot: the history of Christianity's and the West's attitude toward Islam during the past nine centuries is replete with dark periods of imperialism, repression, and attempted domination of the Islamic world. Yet, in 1995 -- eight-hundred ninety-seven years after the First Crusade--radical fundamentalists still believe in the existence of an ongoing western "conspiracy" against Islam: the western alliance between various Arab states and the U.S., the existence of Israel, the western defeat of Saddam Hussein, the unwillingness to intervene militarily to save Bosnian Muslims, and the Israeli-P.L.O. agreement, and even the proposed counter-terrorist legislation are all cited by fundamentalists as evidence of the West's desire to destroy Islam.

One of the core sources that fed the ranks and appetite of Islamic militant fundamentalists was the victorious Jihad [holy war] launched by the mujahideen against

the Soviet-imposed regime of Afghanistan. Ironically, it was U.S. aid (and that of Saudi Arabia and to a far lesser extent that of Iran) that largely made the military prowess of the holy warriors so brutally effective. But following the successful eviction of the Soviets, Iranian and Sudanese fundamentalist leaders have successfully redirected the rage of the newly-trained Islamic forces against a new enemy--western "infidels."

The Different Movements

In the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas has grown exponentially since the beginning of the intifadah in 1987. Feeding on the nationalist Palestinian rebellion, Hamas leaders have called for the killing of all Jews, the reunification of the Muslim ummah [Islamic nation] and the recreation of the Pan-Islamic state. In fact, Hamas sees itself and its movement as much larger than a nationalist religious movement fighting against Israel: Hamas leaders have declared that they see themselves in the vanguard of the world Islamic fundamentalist rebellion against the West. Hamas, like other radical fundamentalists, has vowed it will never compromise with Israel or the West.

The savagery of Hamas' atrocities against both Jews and brother Palestinians is infamous: victims are routinely mutilated and executed in the most ghastly possible ways--beheadings, strangulations, pouring of acid, burning of victims, cutting off limbs, and gouging out of eyes are just some of Hamas' imprints. The viciousness of the mutilations is not an accident: it is a reflection of the movement's fanaticism.

Hamas is not alone in spearheading violent attacks. The level of violence committed by other fundamentalist groups against Arab regimes, as well as the violent reprisals against the groups, has reached unprecedented proportions. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, the parent organization of Hamas, is deeply entrenched in many parts of Egyptian society. In Upper Egypt, especially in the area near Asayut, fundamentalists control large chunks of Egyptian territory. Most alarmingly, some intelligence officials have raised serious questions about the degree to which fundamentalists have infiltrated various levels of the Egyptian internal security services.

In Algeria, the rise of fundamentalism elicited a brutal government takeover, which many see as only short-lived. The fundamentalist FIS was, in 1992, on the verge of gaining electoral control of the Algerian government. Despite the fact that it had professed a commitment to democracy, the question of whether it would have carried out its commitment has been the subject of a great debate in Middle Eastern and European political circles. Now, of course, it may be too late: the secularists took the reins of power in a military coup and the fundamentalist hatred of the present Algerian military government seems beyond peaceful accommodation in the long run. Assassinations in Algeria of "secularist" doctors, lawyers and scientists happen almost every week.

In Lebanon, the fundamentalist Hezbollah scored dramatic electoral victories in parliamentary elections in 1992. There, too, the Party of God [Hezbollah] has assiduously built a two-track system on its way to power: a terrorist network that attacks Israeli targets and a popular social-political-religious infrastructure consisting of schools, clinics, youth associations and sports leagues throughout southern Lebanon.

Across the Gulf, the Saudi Royal Family, in an effort to keep the dagger pointed in the opposite direction, provides hundreds of millions of petrodollars to the radical fundamentalist movements in the Muslim World. Sudan, placed on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist nations in 1993, has become a de facto satellite of Iran, used as both a training base and conduit for money and weapons to radical Islamic groups throughout the world. Even in Jordan, which has made peace with Israel, the Islamic Bloc

is openly sponsoring Hamas.

Militant Islamic fundamentalists have now declared all-out war on their most bitter enemy: "secularist activists" and on all those who would accept co-existence with the West. In Egypt, Algeria and Turkey, more than 200 prominent "secular" writers, journalists, doctors and intellectuals have been attacked and killed by fundamentalists in the past three years. Their crime? Advocating the separation of church and state, a heresy reviled by Islamists as worthy of death. Sheik Mahmud Taha, the 87-year old religious leader of a Sudanese Islamic movement that championed humanism and pluralism, was hung by the Sudanese regime for committing "apostasy" against Islam.

It is not difficult to see why Islamic fundamentalists have been able to exploit the near-total social breakdown in the Arab world. Radical fundamentalists thrive on social deprivation and mass economic deterioration, thus providing convenient scapegoats: it is the fault of the evil West, of Christians, of democracy and capitalism, and, most importantly, of the despicable Jews who rule the world. At the same time, competing and possibly alternative ideologies such as nationalism, pan-Arabism and communism, have one by one been discredited. These expressions, which rarely get heard unfiltered in the West, are rampant in fundamentalist sermons, lectures, publications, and videos in both the Middle East and the United States as well.

Yet, the growth of fundamentalism is not limited to the lower economic strata or to mere economic frustrations. Two years ago, the Egyptian government busted a ring of militant fundamentalists who had carried out murderous terrorist attacks. Those arrested were engineers, lawyers and doctors. Perhaps, even more significant is the growing internationalization of the Islamic fundamentalist network in an increasingly interconnected clandestine infrastructure.

STATUS IN AFRICA

In Africa, the Subcommittee's main focus, Islamic radicalism has not taken hold in any large measure among the 265 million Muslims, who constitute one fourth to one-third of Africa's population. This is due to a variety of deep-rooted reasons: economic, sociological, and ecological, all which seem to predict that this will be the case for the future as well. The continent does not seem to be the platform for any Islamic violent resurgence. The two big waves of Islamic violent resurgence in the 1980s: the emergence of Islamic Iran and the victory of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan, both of which shook the Arab and Muslim worlds but have left Africa as a whole, virtually untouched.

However, one should not be too complacent. Africa must be seen not as a continent, but as an entity which is constituted of very different parts. A closer look at each of these constituent parts reveals some very serious signs of new embryonic growth of militant Islam.

What are the general characteristics of these threatening areas? Geographically we are talking primarily about North Africa, from East to West [including the Sudan]. Demographically it is mainly the non-black population. Ethnically, it is primarily the Arab Muslims, not only in North Africa, but also the Lebanese Shi'ites in West Africa [and some Indian Muslims in South Africa, as well]. Religiously, it is primarily Sunni Muslims, with the exception of Lebanese Shi'ite Muslims in Central Africa. **It should be noted that the Iranian involvement and support in various Muslim Sunni states and societies, such as the Sudan, communities in South Africa, and fundamentalist organizations in Egypt reflect the Iranian ecumenical approach toward the Sunni world of Islam rather than simply the existence of Shi'ite population there.**

Familiarity with the specifics of each petentially dangerous locale is equally as

important to an understanding of general characteristics of these countries that are susceptible to radical Islam. For many of these same reasons: geography, ethnicity, religion, politics, and history, each country faces its own unique situation, and often times dilemma, in facing the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism burgeoning on its home territory.

There are reports of the emergence of a new Shi'ite-oriented fundamentalist Islamic organization, named Qiblah [meaning praying towards Mecca]. Also, there is solvent information that the Iranian embassy in South Africa is active in Muslim communities in Johannesburg. On the other hand, one of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef's co-conspirators, Ishtiyaq Parker, a Sunni Muslim of Indian origin, is a member of the Indian Muslim community of South Africa. According to recent reports this is a very radical community, in whose mosques radical accusations were made about Parker, calling him a traitor to Islam for handing over Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to U.S. authorities.

The Lebanese Shi'ites have been in the business and economic lives of Central African countries. However, members of the Muslim communities there have been involved with Hezbollah for some time. In 1985 one of these communities was the distributor of timers and detonators for terrorist acts that took place later, such as the French UTA plane blown up over Niger in September 1989. We do not have information of more recent terrorist attacks, but Hezbollah is no longer a Shi'ite Lebanese based organization, as we knew it in the past. Rather it has become an international terrorist organization with communities and operatives on five continents: North America, South America, Africa, Europe, and Asia. Because of this, the Hezbollah operatives in Central Africa may emerge at any wholly unpredictable moment to endanger Hezbollah targets.

Sudan

Sudan, under the spiritual and practical leadership of the Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi, remains one of the most dangerous terrorist regimes not only in Africa, but in the entire Muslim world. Sudan has become the center of Mujahideen networks and activists who were forced to leave Pakistan. It is now the training and logistical headquarters for Mujahideen wherever they fight in the 1990s: Egypt, Kashmir, Bosnia, Palestine, the Philippines, Algeria, and the Islamic militant opposition groups in the whole Arab Muslim world. The PAIC [Popular Arab and Islamic Conference] is an organization which Turabi created to serve his ambitions to lead the Sunni world of Islam and to substitute for the conservative Organization of Islamic Conference [OIC] led by Saudi Arabia. It has convened last week for its third convention [the first was in April 1991, immediately after the Gulf War, and the second was in December 1993]. As in the first two conferences, this conference too has united over the anti-Western, anti-Christian ideology targeting primarily the United States and its allies. In the third convention there was participation of scores of terrorist organizations and militant groups, primarily Muslim, but strangely enough even some Christian groups were invited. Reports from the conference are under way. **It is very important to recall in this respect the emerging role of Turabi's Sudan in the second plot of the World Trade Center conspiracy, in which members of the Sudanese delegation to the United Nations were apparently directly involved with one of the leading perpetrators, another Sudanese, Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali. Above and beyond that, new information strongly suggests that the roots of the WTC and anti-Pope conspiracies in the Philippines contain a Sudanese role in the WTC bombing. There is also evidence pointing to the involvement in the plotsof Usama bin Laden, the ex-Afghan Saudi Mujahideen supporter now taking refuge in the Sudan.**

Today, Sudan serves as host and provides training and sanctuary to militant Islamic groups, such as Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Both groups have also received weapons and partial funding from the Sudan. Hamas terrorists who have fled Gaza and the West Bank are known to receive full support in the Sudan. One Hamas leader, Sheikh Muhammad Siyyam, is now headquartered in the Sudan. Another senior Hamas leader, Mousa Abu Marzuk, has been known to travel frequently to the Sudan. According to U.S. and European intelligence services, there are at least a dozen training camps for such terrorists. Iranian support to other Islamic insurgent military camps has also been confirmed by U.S. intelligence. European and U.S. intelligence officials have found that Sudanese diplomatic missions have been increasingly used to provide material support to indigenous radical Islamic movements. Sudanese diplomatic passports have been given to known terrorists -- both Islamic and secular --for international travel.

Last September, in an effort to test the statements of Sudanese officials that they would investigate all reports of terrorist camps on their soil, the U.S. Ambassador provided proof to Sudanese Foreign Ministry officials, of a large terrorist base at the Merkhiyat Popular Defense camp, northwest of Khartoum. But the Foreign Ministry ignored the information and never responded to the Ambassador.

Any question about Turabi's view of Islamic terrorism was answered by his comments in October following the deadly suicide Hamas attack on a downtown Tel-Aviv bus, which killed 22 persons: Turabi praised the attack calling it "honorable."

When Hasan Al-Turabi visited the United States in 1992 -- and was hosted by several American front groups -- he secretly met with Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman to coordinate training of demobilized mujahideen warriors from Afghanistan. According to intelligence officials, both men agreed that Sudanese camps would accommodate new warriors from the Gamaa Islamiya, who would train in the Sudan for infiltration into Egypt. Sheikh Abdul Rahman himself, before moving to Brooklyn in 1990, used Sudan as a temporary headquarters.

In interviews with Western journalists and before sympathetic academicians, Turabi denies that he is anti-democratic or that he supports terrorism or that his regime engages in any human rights violations. Amnesty International has found that the Sudanese regime is a flagrant violator of human rights. Its recently published report "The Tears of Orphans" is a chilling documentation of a massive pattern of torture, executions, and political imprisonment against large sections of the population deemed to be "opponents" of the regime. To quote from the opening chapter:

"Anyone suspected of opposition to the government or its policies is at risk of arrest. This is as true in the major cities and rural areas of northern Sudan as it is in the war zones. Displaced southerners, refugees, members of Muslim religious orders that do not conform to the government's interpretation of Islam, lawyers, members of the military, women protesting at the cost of living, students protesting at changes in their allowances, trade unionists, political activists, journalists, foreign nationals, musicians, artists, and many others have been detained. Some have subsequently been convicted of political offences at unfair trials; the majority have simply been held without charge for weeks, months and sometimes years.

Year after year, detainees report experiencing or witnessing torture in "ghost houses" and security offices. Some have died as a result. The authorities claim they take a firm stand against torture and ill-treatment, but the reported pattern of beatings, burnings, harsh physical exercises and grotesque forms of humiliation remains consistent."

Raschid Al-Ghannuchi

One of Turabi's Islamic soul mates is Raschid Al-Ghannuchi, leader of the militant Islamic Tunisian fundamentalist group, Al-Nahdah. He lives in exile in London, having been sentenced to death in Tunis for his alleged role in orchestrating lethal terrorist attacks, in which one American was killed. He travels on both Sudanese (under the name of Muhammad Said) and Iranian passports.

Ghannuchi, in interviews with western journalists, has repeatedly affirmed his commitment to "democracy," "human rights," "pluralism" and "tolerance." Recently, a Wall Street Journal article referred to Ghannuchi as one of Islam's new generation of Muslim "reformers." The reason Ghannuchi has assiduously cultivated such a moderate image is that his only hope of gaining power is through expressing in the West a commitment to "democracy" -- one of the sure ways of eliciting western sympathy and possible support. Besides, being out of power, Ghannuchi has nothing to lose and everything to gain by affirming his belief in democracy and pluralism. The sincerity of this commitment is another story. **A closer inspection of Ghannuchi's statements in Arabic to closed Islamic conferences -- held primarily in the West -- show that Ghannuchi's real views are diametrically different than the image he projects to the West.**

Let me cite just several of Al-Ghannuchi's statements made at radical Islamic conferences: Three years ago, Ghannuchi appeared at a conference in Chicago sponsored by the Islamic Committee for Palestine, a Tampa, Florida based support group for the notorious Palestinian terrorist group Islamic Jihad. At this conference -- which featured leaders of radical Islamic movements from around the globe -- Al Ghannuchi made this statement:

"The Zionist movement does not only target Palestine. It does not only target Arabs and Muslims. It targets the entire world. It targets goodness. It targets the entirety of positive values that have crystallized in humanity. This Zionist movement confronts not only Muslims, but all humanity, and all its values of truth and goodness, that humanity has produced in its history, and the values of the family and solidarity, all these values are threatened by the Zionist project. There is no doubt about this. And Zionism drives all these Western societies into division and disintegration, and finishes off whatever values of religion have remained in this humanity. Every evil in the world, the Zionists are behind it. This is no exaggeration. There are so many evils in this world, and behind which are the Children of Israel."

At another radical Islamic conference in 1989, held in Kansas City, Ghannuchi was one of the top speakers alongside actual Hamas terrorists who regaled the Islamic crowd with details of Hamas executions and operations. That Ghannuchi was invited to serve as a featured speaker at this Hamas convention -- at which actual would-be terrorists were recruited to carry out operations against Israelis -- indicates the mutual constellations of interests between Ghannuchi's Al-Nahdah, Hamas and other radical groups.

Ghannuchi's comments at this 1989 conference: ***"O brother and sister Mujahideen, I salute you and transmit to you greetings from your brothers in Tunis, including those who are behind bars, imprisoned in the past few days following a tempestuous march of solidarity with the triumphant march of the people of the Intifadhah, in its second commemoration, and peace be upon you, and mercy of Allah, and his blessing."***

"The Islamic Ummah: Once again it embarks upon the salvation of humanity, confronting the Zionist project in Palestine, seeking to save the civilization of mankind, the salvation of the Islamic Ummah. Humanity has surrendered to the Zionist project today, and there is no hope for the civilization of man, there is no hope for goodness and mercy and justice except that the vanguards of the Islamic Ummah lift away the damage forever."

"What you are embarking on is not just a regional project. It is not merely the liberation of one land of the many well-known lands. Rather, you are embarking on the salvation of man, by the salvation of Islam -- the salvation of the civilization of humanity -- because the Zionist project is a danger to all goodness in the entire world."

"And the Arab regimes have already shown their complete inability to embark on this immense project, because of the estrangement of the Arab regimes from the spirit of this Ummah, and from its Islam, because their repressive political system has estranged them from the multitudes, and they [the regimes] have become allies of the enemies of Islam."

Egypt

Although the last few months have marked some major victories of the Egyptian military over the militant terrorist organizations of Egypt, the Gihad and the Gamaa Islamiya, [primarily in the Cairo metropolitan area] the general clash between the regime and the militant Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt has become much more serious. This very dangerous development is reflected in the regimes turn, for the first time a half-year ago, against the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood, created in the late 1920s for many years and especially in the last decade constituted the more conservative, more mainstream Islamic force in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood has been gravitating toward the extremists for several years now. This ended a half-year ago when some revealing facts showed they colluded with the extremists, an act that precipitated the government's turn against them. This development indicates an escalation of the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt.

In the face of this development, the regime is trying to acquire support from every constituency in Egypt. The regime has embraced back into it both members and policies of the old-time nationalists and Nasserists. At the same time, the regime by justifying Iran's drive for nuclear capability, is attempting to court Iran in the hopes that Iran will cut back support to the terrorist groups in Egypt. Sufi Islam is another constituent group the regime is trying to encourage through support of their traditional organization, the Tariqas [Sufi Islam is a type of popular Islam which is primarily self-oriented and non-violent. It was organized in past centuries in communal organizations called Tariqa -- something one could very generally compare in organization to Christian Orders.]

To what extent the Egyptian regime succeeds in this third approach is a question to be determined in the future. In the meantime, it's more like running trains one against the other or a brinkmanship policy. It seems to repeat the late President Sadat's strategy of pitting one group against the other. Sadat did that by releasing the Muslim Brotherhood activists from jail in order to fight his war against the Communists. Today, Mubarak seems to do the same by pitting the secular, nationalist, Nasserists against the militant Muslims. In Sadat 's case, the Muslims who he supported turned back against him, assassinating him. Is that going to be Mubarak's fate by the radical nationalist, who he supports now? No one has a crystal ball. But in any case, the situation in getting graver every month.

In Morocco, the regime succeeds through harsh measures to curb threats and opposition, from time to time we do hear of terrorist outbursts. Some of these occurred in 1994 and 1995 targeting tourists, a Jewish synagogue in Casablanca, and security in organs in Fez. It is noteworthy that the operatives were members of the Mujahideen network of Afghanistan who came back to Morocco, went to fight in Bosnia, and then again returned, one of whom was arrested in Germany. This again shows the transfer of terrorist activities into Europe.

On January 21, 1995, Interior Ministers of North African Arab Muslim countries met in Tunis, with European Interior Ministers from France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, etc. to coordinate effective measures and policies against the fundamentalists in all of Western North Africa.

Algeria -- FIS

In Algeria, the general trend is difficult to ascertain. The regime seems to have consolidated its hold in the main cities which constitute the majority of the secular, Westernized, and cultured population who are willing to fight against militant Islam for their freedom. The army seems to be determined together with the regime to unleash violent, brutal, and merciless attacks. Especially as it appears supported by parts of the population that will not give in to militant Islam. All of this seems to bear results in the fact that some opposition groups are willing now to conduct a dialogue with the regime.

Another important element of the Algerian regime's relative success is the determined extremely significant encouragement it gets from France [which included great financial support (e.g. one billion dollars to help pay their debts)]. What is sure is that the beginning of a dialogue between the opposition groups and the regime may only intensify the struggle because the militant groups will become desperate. Moreover, FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) which was considered to be the more conservative and more moderate Islamic movement in Algeria, may find itself isolated and may join the more radical elements simply to preserve its own power.

With respect to the situation in Algeria, one should always bear in mind the biggest threat that it poses to the West in that it exports the struggle to European countries, not only France, but also to Belgium and to Germany, where some Algerian militants operate. Belgium was threatened after the arrest of several GIA -- Armed Islamic Group operatives and the confiscation of some of their weapons.

At present, the debate about Algeria's future has the United States in the middle, with a slight preference given to the Islamic opposition forces.

As the number of those killed exceeds 40,000, with atrocities committed by both the military and the Islamic opposition, it is hard to determine which side is worse. The brutalization of the fight between the regime and its Islamic opponents has unleashed a murderous nightmare in Algiers. As the government ruthlessly attempts to wipe out its opponents, Islamic groups have increasingly assassinated intellectuals, secularists, journalists and feminists -- including those who will not don the hijab. Who's responsible for this horrendous state of affairs?

To some democratic pundits, the fact that the regime twice canceled the elections that would surely have resulted in Islamist takeovers is proof positive that the stolen elections lead directly to the radicalization of FIS. This seemingly rational explanation of how FIS and other groups became radicalized is abetted by the exceptionally-sounding moderate statements of various FIS leaders, in particular, Anwar Haddam, FIS' American based representative. Haddam has, for the most part,

routinely condemned acts of violence and terrorism while calling for a peaceful democratic transition to power. (Haddam did not condemn, however, the recent car bombing in Algiers; at a speech, he openly supported the attack, claiming it was aimed at a military target.) Haddam's stance, together with politically restrained comments made by other leaders of FIS, has lead the United States to press the current Algerian regime for a negotiated settlement with the FIS.

Coincidentally, American citizens and diplomats have been spared by the GIA death squads, which have simultaneously brutally killed European "infidels" as well as Algerian secularists and feminists. In point of fact, the coincidence is more than happenstance; GIA's decision not to attack American targets originated from the recognition that FIS needs to sustain American support; any attacks on Americans could turn the U.S. against FIS. This demonstrates the possible existence of some type of arrangement between FIS and GIA -- a relationship both groups deny exists.

Although FIS contains moderate elements and officials -- Anwar Haddam seems to be one of them -- the fact remains that long before the canceled elections, FIS leaders had publicly expressed radical views, including exhortations to their followers to kill all Jews and Americans.

On January 12, 1991, Paris International Service reported from Algeria on a rally led by FIS leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj,

"*A war in the Gulf could be considered a war against Algeria, said Abassi Madani at the Mosque of Kouba in the outskirts of Algiers yesterday. After having observed a long silence on the development of the situation in the Gulf, Belhaj and his colleague Madani came out to ask the 6,000 loyal supporters gathered for the prayer, as well as all the FIS sympathizers, to take action. To the question of what to do at the critical moment, the answer is simple: Attack U.S. and Jewish interests anywhere in the world. In attacking Saddam, the American and their allies aim at depriving the Muslims of the Iraqi military potential, useful for the forthcoming decisive war which the Muslims will wage against the Jews, said Ali Belhaj, referring to and once again interpreting the Koran as he wishes.*"

In August 1990, Abassi Madani spoke to Algerian journalists about FIS' position on the Gulf War. Madani claimed,

"*What is taking place in the Gulf is a new form of Crusades, in addition to the fact that it is a violation of Islamic sovereignty and an aggression against the sanctity of the two holy mosques, given the flagrant U.S. presence and the Saudi regime's hasty permission for it to be there. This regime has allowed itself to interfere in Allah's will and manage the country as if it owned it. It does not. It is Allah's land, the land of Islam, the land of all Muslims. Therefore, they had no right to open its doors and allow the Americans to bring their colonialist forces into it. Third, the Islamic nation cannot endure such regimes anymore, regimes which are trading in their countries and consecrating the borders, which were drawn by colonialism in order to split them. Therefore, the FIS is calling upon the Islamic nation as a whole to prepare itself as one to abolish such borders and topple such regimes whose collusion with colonialism has become flagrant.*"

At the same time, Ali Belhaj also revealed these views on the Gulf War,

"*The issue here is not merely the issue of the Gulf. The issue here is an issue between Islam and blasphemy. The struggle is now between Islam and the crusade. It is not a simple struggle over a piece of land. The enemies of Islam, including the rancorous crusaders and the cunning Zionists, whenever they see, brothers, Islamic peoples trying*

to return to Islam, they carry out such actions aimed at diverting the people's attention from the sound path and their goal."

At a Tehran Conference on Palestine in October of 1991, an Iranian correspondent for Ettela'at asked Benazuz, another FIS leader, to explain the FIS view of the Madrid conference. Benazuz explained,

"We reject whatever the Arab rulers decide on Palestine, both in general and in particular, because they receive orders from the East and the West. We oppose all these solutions. Our initial principle is jihad. The problem of Palestine and of the Muslims can only be resolved by blood and weapons. Neither conferences nor the press can determine the fate of a nation. Pretending to shed tears over the Palestinian problem is only a waste of time."

An good indicator of what FIS may have done had it assumed power, occurred in July 1990 following the first round of municipal elections. After taking control of the city council of Constantine, FIS banned co-ed schooling and closed all bars and nightclubs. In the tourist resort of Tipaza the city council prohibited the wearing of shorts and swimming trunks in order to "preserve Arab-Islamic traditions and to defend public morality." In the city councils on the Oran coast, banned, upon assuming power, "all cultural activities of no benefit to citizen's lives" as well as "all festivals organized in Oran towns it controls viewed as 'not conforming to the morals and precepts of Islam.'" This included banning a festival of modern Arabic music known as Rai. FIS instead substituted Islamic religious songs.

Conclusion

A very important note to mention -- the militant terrorist organization and movements are no "agents of change" in the developing societies. Rather they are agents of throwing society to the past, not to modernity, not to development, not to progress, but to regression. With the fact that they lean on democracy and democratic rights, focusing mainly on the fact that elections have been 'hijacked' in Algeria, one should remember that democracy does not constitute one and only one element: elections; rather it is a package that constitutes a cluster of values such as elections, pluralism, equality, freedoms of speech and religion, and respect for others' religion, beliefs, and views. The militant Islamic regimes stand only for one facet of this: elections, which seems to them to serve their purpose in taking over. Such elections are a kind of one time oath of allegiances to Allah and not free elections in the Western sense of the concept. So, the West should not be mislead or fooled into accepting only one element of the package and forgetting about their motives -- taking over the reins of power after which they will apply their militant fundamentalist ideology which does not include any of the cluster of values.

Another argument that is raised in the favor of the militant Islamic movement is their commitment to the social needs of the community (e.g. welfare, medical treatment, education). While this commitment is appreciable one should not forget attached ideological motivation and indoctrination. In that sense one could appreciate the European totalitarian movements such as Fascism and Nazism for the same, as well as for the economic development of their countries which restored human pride to millions of unemployed citizens and recreated their communities and society in general during the 1920's and 1930's. If commitment to social needs is the criteria regardless of the attached values and ideology then Nazism would have been considered no less positive a movement, which is absurd.

"THE NATURE AND THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN NORTH AFRICA"

TESTIMONY OF
JASON F. ISAACSON
DIRECTOR OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING ON
THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

APRIL 6, 1995

Madam Chairwoman, thank you for the invitation to testify today on an issue which is of great salience to our Government, to friendly governments throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Europe, and to citizens here and in many countries who share your commitment to economic and political progress, regional security, and the protection of individual rights on the African Continent.

I represent the American Jewish Committee, a private, non-profit organization with some 50,000 members in 34 regional chapters across the United States. Since 1906, the American Jewish Committee has fostered understanding and cooperation among Americans across religious, ethnic and racial lines. We have fought bigotry and anti-Semitism in our own country and around the world, protecting Jewish communities and other religious minorities abroad while playing a critical role in advancing the cause of human rights. We have sought to promote the ideals of American democratic pluralism in other lands, working with governments and private institutions -- from Central and Eastern Europe, to Southeast Asia, to Latin America -- to develop the infrastructure of tolerance and understanding. We have worked to strengthen the mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and Israel; in that regard, we have actively supported the Arab-Israeli peace process and the central role played by the United States in advancing that process.

In fact, Madam Chairwoman, I had the honor of representing the American Jewish Committee as an observer at the opening conference of the Middle East negotiating process in Madrid in October 1991, and again at the opening of the multilateral phase of the process in Moscow in January 1992. As friends of Israel and hopeful, but clear-eyed, supporters of the peace process, the American Jewish Committee has paid particular attention in recent years to two issues that are properly the focus of today's hearing: first, the threat of terrorism fueled by, or linked to, militant Islamic extremism -- a threat to Israel and Israelis, to Jews everywhere, to America and the West generally, indeed, to the values and institutions of modern civilization, in North Africa, the Middle East, and across the globe; second, the success of moderation in the Arab world, for it is only through the continued well-being and stability of moderate Arab regimes -- and the continued isolation,

and ultimate failure, of provocative rogue regimes in the region -- that reconciliation with Israel will take root and grow, and that the region's economies and prospects for trade and security cooperation will expand.

My perspective on the threat of Islamic extremism in Africa, therefore, is inherently Middle Eastern -- bound up in matters of security for Israel and the welfare of Israel's partners in peace now and in the future, as the region's circle of political and economic normalization widens. I will thus focus my remarks predominantly on North Africa, the region of the Continent that, through historic migration patterns and present political realities, is most closely linked to the Middle East. Sub-Saharan states with large Muslim populations and formidable development challenges -- including Chad, Mali, Senegal and Niger -- may also be threatened by the spread of Islamic extremism. But as the phenomenon of Islamic extremism emanates from and strongly influences the Middle East, my testimony today addresses the Islamic extremist threat in North Africa within a largely Middle Eastern regional context.

Extremist, Not Islamic Threat

The American Jewish Committee respects the traditional values of Islam as we respect those of other religious faiths. Indeed, we have sought to explore the commonalities and points of difference between Islam and Judaism in national Muslim-Jewish conferences that we have sponsored for the last two years at the University of Denver, and we have initiated or cosponsored Muslim-Jewish dialogues in all of our larger chapters. AJC has also fought diligently against discrimination and acts of intolerance directed against Arab Americans and American Muslims, particularly at the time of the Gulf War, when such incidents occurred with dismaying frequency. We have been proud to work with Arab and Muslim coalition partners on a range of public policy issues in Washington -- from advocacy of a more forceful U.S. posture in the Bosnian crisis, to the protection of the rights of religious minorities in our own country.

AJC's record on intergroup relations and our longstanding support for human rights reflects a basic commitment to freedom of religious belief and practice, and to safeguarding individuals from discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic identity. These rights apply to Muslims, Christians, Jews, and members of any other religion. We assess groups and individuals by their actions without regard to their religious beliefs, and we encourage governments to expand political pluralism and freedom of expression.

In this regard, our concern in North Africa -- as in the Middle East and South Asia -- is not with the spread of Islam, the flowering or strengthening of Islamic culture, the increasing religiosity of followers of Islam in that or other parts of the world, or the involvement in politics of deeply religious Muslims. As Jews, as fellow children of Abraham, we respect and honor a kindred faith.

Our concern, Madam Chairwoman, is with the politicization of Islam and the manipulation of Islam for extremist ends -- ends that would deny individual rights; that

would end religious liberty; that would foreclose democratization even in the name of political reform; that would nullify freedom of thought and expression; that would radicalize governments and destabilize strategically vital regions; that would foment or contribute to acts of terrorism; that would pose substantial threats to American interests, American institutions and individuals, and the interests and citizens of friendly states.

Our concern is shared by many governments and individuals, of varying political perspective, throughout North Africa and the Middle East. In recent visits by the American Jewish Committee to Tunisia, Jordan and to the fundamentalist Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we heard from the most senior government officials and from individual citizens expressions of grave concern about the internal and external threat posed by Islamic extremists. Nowhere is the appreciation of the extremist threat greater than in those and other moderate states. As we said in a recent advertisement -- urging strong action against terrorism -- that was placed by AJC in newspapers and magazines in the United States and abroad: "[M]oderate Arab states must be supported in their efforts to contain the forces of extremism. They are on the front line in this struggle."

Surely, many hardcore members of extremist groups in North Africa and the Middle East act out of religious inspiration -- that is, their misinterpretation and distortion of Islamic values to suit a political agenda, and to justify violent, terrorist means. In the Seventh Islamic Conference Organization Summit in Casablanca last December, it was just such misinterpretation and distortion that was strikingly singled out by the 50 member-nations in Item 3 of their Final Communique, when they condemned terrorism carried out in the name of Islam as "a clear deviation from the teachings of the righteous Islamic religion and blatant violation of our values, norms and heritage." But although radical Islam may be a catalyst, or a cover, for political action, it appears that the key factors in the extremists' success in mobilizing mass support, as Assistant Secretary of State Pelletreau has pointed out, are economic, social and political deprivation.

I would like to describe the threat as we see it, assess its impact on U.S. interests, and explain how it affects issues of concern to AJC specifically.

Trouble Spots: Sudan and Algeria

The two most serious threats from Islamic extremist groups in North Africa are in Sudan and Algeria.

Since a 1989 military coup, Sudan has been governed by an increasingly extremist Islamic regime. The ruling National Islamic Front is headed by Hassan Turabi, who has ties to extremist elements in Algeria, Iran, and Egypt. A haven for terrorist groups operating against Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Israel, Sudan is on the State Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism. Its military is pinned down by a civil war to the south, and it receives training from Iran's Revolutionary Guards. Eight of those currently suspected of planning terrorist attacks on public, Government and U.N. sites in New York City have Sudanese passports. Sudan's intentions -- like those of Iran -- may be both ambitious and

dangerous, for the entire region. State-sponsorship of terrorism must be ended, and the U.S. must exert its leadership to that end.

The situation in Algeria, presently and for the near future, is one of uneasy stalemate. Neither the military-backed Government nor the array of Islamic extremist groups has the upper hand in what some have labeled a full-fledged civil war. Any lasting solution will have to be political in nature. But a victory by extremists, however unwelcome, cannot be ruled out completely.

The 1991 parliamentary elections gave the Islamic Salvation Front -- or FIS -- a decisive victory, and this victory was owed largely to two factors. First, the ruling National Liberation Front -- or FLN -- had served Algerians poorly in its nearly 30-year reign; Government corruption, economic failure and political repression had cost it much support. Second, the FIS constituted the only opposition party with the organization and capacity to mobilize voters.

Since the FIS was banned in 1992 and its leaders either arrested or deported, the Armed Islamic Group -- or GIA -- has descended from a guerrilla force exclusively attacking military targets into a ruthless terrorist organization. Its victims include thousands of women and children, intellectuals, politicians, tourists, and foreign workers. Human rights violations abound on both sides of the conflict, and the violence continues to escalate as I speak. The GIA's brutal methods have generated a backlash; citizens have begun organizing neighborhood patrols and asking for extra weapons to defend against terrorist attacks. GIA activities have continued despite harsh measures by the Algerian military, and there is no prospect of ending the insurrection. This grave situation is not one we would wish to see repeated elsewhere in North Africa; it is my hope and belief that continued diligence on the part of other governments in the region, with our and other nations' support, can avert such an eventuality. Many in Tunisia and Morocco, fearing any repeat of the Algeria crisis, accept their governments' strict measures against extremists.

American investment and economic assistance promote stability while advancing U.S. interests in Algeria's hydrocarbon sector. The Export-Import Bank has provided $2 billion in loan guarantees for American projects in Algeria, and Algeria's hydrocarbon sector has annual imports of $300 million in U.S. goods and services. The U.S. Government provides an additional $550 million in credits for American agricultural exports.

As Assistant Secretary Pelletreau has reported, the U.S. Government encourages dialogue between the Algerian Government and responsible opposition elements; the U.S. continues its own contacts with groups disavowing violence. The agreement recently signed in Rome between Algerian opposition groups may show promise, but ultimately the U.S. actions can have little direct impact on the outcome in Algeria. Our concern focuses on the regional implications of the current situation.

Pro-Western regimes in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt are concerned about the insurgency in Algeria and its impact on extremist elements in their countries, and, in the

cases of Morocco and Tunisia, on the stability of their border with Algeria. Morocco and Tunisia have already been targeted by terrorists originating from Sudan and Algeria, and they fear possible spillover should FIS or GIA come to power. The recent visits here by Morocco's King Hassan II and Jordan's King Hussein underscored the apprehensiveness of moderate Arab regimes.

While its stability is not in doubt, Egypt is anxious about U.S. openings to FIS representatives, and what it might mean for future U.S. policy towards extremist groups in the region. Egypt has already seen a number of attacks by the Islamic Group -- or Gama'at -- which do not threaten the regime's stability but do create increasing economic problems, discourage tourism and foreign investment, and prevent the Government from expanding political freedoms.

Sudan and Algeria are the most extreme cases. Real economic and political changes in the years preceding the advent of civil insurrection might have averted some of the present consequences. It may be the case that U.S. influence -- or indeed any outside role -- is now very limited. However, there remains much we can do for other countries threatened by domestic Islamic extremism. And much has already been achieved.

Early Responses: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan

Madam Chairwoman, I would like at this time to acknowledge the substantial progress achieved in North Africa and elsewhere. Some of the key countries in the Middle East and North African regions are successfully promoting democracy alongside traditional Islamic culture. Turkey has demonstrated a significant commitment to secular democratic rule. Jordan and Morocco exemplify the emergence of constitutional monarchies committed to democratization and pluralism. Tunisia has achieved impressive economic reforms and standard of living, and a recent broadening of political reform. Egypt's parliament and press allow free debate, and President Hosni Mubarak retains popular legitimacy as he grapples with economic and political challenges. While it would be wrong to call any of these regimes democratic by American standards, it is worth recognizing the challenges lining their road to liberalization. The prospects for stability and democratization in North Africa and the Middle East are hopeful, but the United States and our allies must act clearly and consistently to ensure the continuation and expansion of these positive trends.

In February, AJC delegations visited Jordan as well as Tunisia, and let me briefly relate some of our impressions from those missions as they relate to the subject of today's hearing.

Jordan's King Hussein is clearly committed to peace with Israel, and we expressed to him our tremendous admiration for his leadership and our appreciation for his efforts which resulted in last October's peace treaty. AJC President Robert Rifkind also conveyed AJC's concern over the increasing threat from Islamic extremism. The AJC delegation took special note, in the case of Jordan, of the domestic progress over the past five years beginning with the National Charter of 1990, parliamentary elections with the participation

of Islamist and Palestinian parties, and substantive economic reforms -- all constituting a resolute bulwark against extremism and a positive development for greater political freedoms and economic growth. We feel confident of King Hussein's credibility among his people and of his regime's stability, and we should support Jordan's efforts in this regard. The granting of full debt relief to Jordan, currently an issue before the Congress, will show our commitment to the peace process in which Jordan is now fully engaged, and help move that process forward.

In North Africa, Tunisia faces the extremist threat armed with a strong record of social and economic reforms. Home ownership is 70 percent, inflation stands at 5 percent, school enrollment exceeds 85 percent, and population growth has declined to 1.9 percent. The Government is trying to privatize. In other words, Tunisians have a stake in their society; the Government has successfully kept the public invested in the stability of the current political system. More reforms are needed, especially on the political side, but they are moving in the right direction. With U.S. and international encouragement, Tunisia has permitted 19 parliamentary seats to opposition parties. The AJC delegation came away extremely impressed with the Tunisian model for preempting the extremist appeal through economic and social means, and some political participation for the opposition. It has been aptly billed as an AID and IMF "success story."

As Tunisia's Minister of Interior told AJC -- and I quote -- "Social and economic development and well-being are the best defenders against terrorism." Madam Chairwoman, we could not agree more. The Minister also spoke of Tunisia's desire for U.S. assistance in fighting terrorism. He said -- and I quote again -- "We are confident that we have mastered the situation internally, but we have not mastered the external component of terrorism. The U.S. could play a role in helping us." We owe it to ourselves to support counterterrorism efforts wherever possible.

Morocco's King Hassan is addressing the need for structural adjustments to the political and economic systems as a means of improving public confidence in the rule of law. Privatization of the economy and foreign investment are slowly expanding. The King's popular legitimacy is widespread, and there is little indigenous terrorist or extremist activity in the Kingdom.

Vice President Gore's recent trip to the Middle East, which resulted in several economic agreements with Egypt, has undoubtedly helped to shore up pro-Western regimes in the region. We hope these agreements will assist Egypt in pursuing additional economic reforms, spur the Mubarak Government to greater political liberalization, and encourage President Mubarak to continue his instrumental involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

U.S. Interests at Stake

The primary interests of the United States in North Africa are regional stability, economic and political development, terrorism, and human rights.

The most significant recent contribution to regional stability has been the Arab-Israeli peace process, resulting in agreements between Israel and two former adversaries -- Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The growing number of Arab states having formal or informal relationships with Israel is a very positive development. Morocco and Tunisia are leading the way in the establishment of formal ties with Israel. Since the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, these developments, in which the United States has played and continues to play a central role, constitute a diplomatic track record of which Americans can be very proud. Republican and Democratic Administrations alike have consistently advocated policies designed to advance coexistence in the Middle East, and AJC continues to support those efforts in the interests of Americans, Israelis, and Arabs.

Progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process will, over time, help to counter the threats of Islamic extremism and terrorist actions against moderate Arab regimes, against Israel, and against Western trade and political partners of those regimes. While Islamic extremism is not always about Israel or the peace process -- and it would be a grave error, for example, to suggest that the peace process is key to events in Algeria -- many extremist groups in the Islamic world use anti-Israel and anti-peace propaganda to gain adherents. During the Gulf War, for example, the use of anti-Semitic slogans by Islamist leaders in Algeria was particularly evident; in January 1991, for example, FIS leader Ali Belhadj led a pro-Iraq demonstration proclaiming, "We are here to drink the blood of the Jews."

By improving the climate for economic revitalization, investment and regional cooperation, and by permitting some slowing of the regional arms race, progress toward peace can remove some of the incentives for disaffected youth to rally behind extremist groups of any persuasion. Much of the attractiveness of the peace process derives from the desire of states for economic and political normalization -- improvements which cannot but hamper extremist designs.

Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt are most concerned with two possibilities, both of which have already begun to materialize. The first is the threat of terrorism exported from movements in other countries. While to date this has happened only occasionally, it remains a real concern for moderate regimes. The second is the impact of extremist success in one country on movements in other parts of the Middle East. Beyond North Africa, the Gulf countries have felt threatened by extremist activities in Sudan and Algeria, and Saudi Arabia, which AJC visited in October 1994, and other nations have fortunately begun to crack down on their own citizens sending funds to support such activities. Most of the funds for Algerian and Egyptian groups, though, probably originate within these countries themselves.

Neither of these phenomena poses an immediate challenge to the survival of moderate regimes in North Africa or elsewhere, but they are the source of much anxiety among friendly governments.

In principle, AJC has faith in constructive dialogue with groups disavowing violence;

indeed, AJC programs stress intergroup dialogue and understanding. But we appreciate the concern of Tunisia and other Arab states that contacts with some Islamists can be counter-productive. Our allies fear that extremists elsewhere in the Middle East may perceive such dialogue as evidence that the United States does not preclude the possibility of Islamic extremists coming to power. This perception, while clearly incorrect, offers a potentially dangerous encouragement to groups seeking the violent overthrow of moderate regimes.

Scholars of Islam disagree over whether there are pragmatists willing to compromise and live with the West for economic reasons on the one hand, and those who maintain there are no moderates at all -- only that some groups mask their hostility to the West in order to gain support and credibility. AJC does not oppose dialogue in principle. But we must strive not to lend legitimacy in world eyes to radicals who present a face of moderation to the West while in fact pursuing an anti-Western, hostile agenda that uses violence and terror as methods for political change.

Our allies in southern Europe are also anxiously watching developments unfold in North Africa. France has close ties to Algeria, with over one million Algerian nationals living in France. Algeria represents a market of 90 million consumers, and supplies Europe with 29 percent of its natural gas. Nearly 10 million Muslims live within the countries of the European Union. Any further migration, combined with possible terrorist attacks in southern Europe, could aggravate already-tense ethnic relations. European nations have coordinated efforts to contain the spread of extremist groups and to interdict terrorist activities.

Concerns have been expressed by some officials in moderate North African states, however, that even more must be done, by European nations and by the United States, to block fundraising, propagandizing and other extremist-support activities by extremists living abroad -- and out of reach of the concerned governments. It is for that reason that AJC has strongly supported the current focus by Congress and the Administration on the need for firmer administrative and legislative countermeasures against terrorism and terrorism-support activities. We look forward to continuing our work with Members of Congress and with Administration officials toward the adoption of tough legislation in this Congress that squarely confronts the international terrorist threat while taking appropriate account of important due process considerations.

On a more global strategic level, we must always guard against the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by radical regimes. Numerous states already possess chemical and biological agents, and Iran is on its way to a possible nuclear capability. Last month's fatal gas attack in Japan is a grim reminder of the security challenge we continue to face. Weapons proliferation is a vital U.S. concern, and should not be ruled out as a potential issue with Islamic extremist groups.

The threat from international terrorism is serious, particularly in the Middle East. Terrorism in North Africa, however, is not a strictly religious phenomenon, nor is it directed from outside. Algeria's nationalist struggle against French colonial rule over 30 years ago

was not based upon religious fervor, yet civilian targets were hardly immune. And the origins, decision-making, and success or failure of domestic groups within North Africa depend overwhelmingly on indigenous factors like colonial history, governmental repression, and economic hardship.

The self-contained nature of these domestic organizations does not preclude the possibility of an eventual spread of terrorist activity to Tunisia or Morocco -- where there have already been isolated attacks -- as well as European and other Western nations. There is evidence linking Iran to movements in Sudan and Algeria, and there is unquestionably a loose international network of Islamic extremist groups. Make no mistake, AJC is committed to the containment of Iran's strategy of destabilization and its direct influence over events in Lebanon and terrorist attacks against Israel and in the West, and evidence in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing points to possible Sudanese and other involvement.

AJC is particularly concerned that Jewish sites and individuals may be singled out as targets of future attacks, as happened last year in London and Buenos Aires, and in France in the 1980s. Islamic extremist rhetoric is rife with anti-Semitic references, even among those presumed to be moderates. Terrorists also identify Jews with Israel and the peace process. We cannot afford to discount the potential for such attacks.

These threats to international security demand our urgent attention. AJC applauds the President's recent executive orders freezing assets of several Middle East terrorist groups operating out of the United States, and banning U.S. companies from oil development agreements with Iran. We look forward to continuing our work to strengthen and build support for the Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Act, the subject of a hearing this morning before the Judiciary Committee.

The fight against terrorism is proceeding on many fronts. French police last month raided an arms network smuggling materials to Algeria, following up leads from an arrest in Spain, and international efforts resulted in a major operation against Islamist cells in Brussels as well. France is confident the GIA will not attack targets in France for the moment, and security cooperation is good in Europe; but eventually some of the weapons headed for Algeria may be used in France or elsewhere. In addition to coordination between our European allies, the G-7 has formed its own counter-terrorism group. These efforts represent a consistent, multilateral, and bipartisan campaign against terrorism overseas and at home. They not only secure against specific threats but send a message to friend and foe alike that the American people are committed to the international rule of law and the struggle against terrorism.

On the human rights level, the degree of atrocities in Algeria is truly shocking; the death toll is near 40,000. Since taking power in 1989, the Sudanese regime has severely restricted political rights and introduced religious coercion and persecution. The imposition of Islamic law on Christians and secular Muslims has been tragic. The best avenue for guaranteeing human rights in North Africa is to hold violators accountable while working

with friendly governments to achieve greater social equality and political freedoms.

There can be no substitute for open, multi-candidate elections. However, elections by themselves are an insufficient foundation for democratic governing. The United States should continue to encourage democratization in the political as well as the economic dimension. Governments from Morocco to Pakistan have sought assistance in the form of economic aid, investment, and cooperation in anti-terrorism efforts. We encourage the continuation of IMF programs in North Africa geared toward economic adjustment and debt restructuring, as well as market reform efforts by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. The Jordanian debt forgiveness package which is now in progress sends an important signal to regimes throughout the Middle East and North Africa about the rewards of peace as well as the prospects for economic stabilization and early political reform. And Egypt's important role in the Desert Storm coalition, the peace process and in Arab leadership can only be enhanced by economic improvements. Let me take this opportunity to urge members of this committee and other Members of Congress to look favorably upon aid packages to African and Middle Eastern countries.

Let us make no mistake: We are at a critical junction in this vital part of the world. U.S. leadership is absolutely necessary -- and much desired -- if we are to emerge successfully, enhancing the prospects of peace, prosperity and stability, and dealing a blow to the forces of extremism. In this effort, the United States must continue to work closely with its allies in Europe and Japan.

Madam Chairwoman, there are very direct challenges facing U.S. policy interests today in the region: combatting terrorism, advancing human rights, protecting democratization and the rule of law, strengthening the Arab-Israeli peace process, and containing the rogue states seeking to undermine the forces of moderation and peace. We will need wisdom, resolve, courage, and perseverance, qualities that our great nation has in abundance when we mobilize our collective will. We can succeed.

Thank you again for this opportunity.

TESTIMONY OF

D. Khalid Durán
Editor, *TransState Islam*
(a quarterly journal published in Washington, DC);
Visiting Professor for Islamic Studies,
Washington Theological Union

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to present my views on the threats posed by widespread and growing Islamist extremism in Africa.

My name is Khalid Durán. For seven years I was an associate professor at the Islamic Research Institute in Islamabad, for nine years a senior research fellow at the German Institute for Middle East Studies, in charge of the desk for Libya, Egypt and Sudan. As a result of family ties to Kenya and Uganda, as well as my knowledge of Kiswahili and Arabic, I have had the opportunity to follow Islamic developments closely over a period of two decades, largely through personal contacts with the protagonists. As a teacher at universities in Austria, Germany, Norway and the United States, I have offered courses on conflict resolution in the context of Islam in Africa.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND ISLAMISM.

In the Muslim world these days, a distinction is made between Islam and Islamism. Islam is the old religion, Islamism is a new ideology. Those whom the western media call "Islamic extremists" go by the name Islamists. We distinguish between Muslims, the common followers of Islamic religion, and Islamists, who have chosen this name for themselves as a mark of distinction.

This terminology expresses the desire to compete with what are

called "foreign ideologies," such as capitalism and communism, liberalism and nationalism. At the same time Islamism proceeds from an interpretation of religion similar to that of fundamentalism in the Christian West.

Thus Islamism combines the self-righteousness of a religious sect with the will for power of a political ideology. The resultant religio-political extremism manifests itself in a supremacist attitude.

As is the wont with totalitarianisms, Islamism thrives on hatred for a principal enemy. This enemy is "the West" in general and the United States in particular. Jews and the State of Israel are seen as one with the US.

Islamists complain that the West is looking at them as the new enemy after the fall of Communism. Such complaints are a mockery. Numerous statements make it plain in so many words that Islamists relish nothing as much as to be conceived as a threat to the West. In the US, visiting Islamist leaders have told their audiences with glee that America will vanish the way the other superpower vanished. World leadership will then be taken over by the Islamists.

With the present regime in Iran this has been a favorite topic for more than a decade. Having correctly predicted the impending demise of the Soviet Empire they now predict the end of the American superpower.

The decisive point here is the rejection of pluralism and the demand that world leadership must belong to Islamists - as if

Islamism were not complete without rule over others.

Islamists often claim to be working for religious renewal and political reform. A perusal of their literature, statements and, especially, their political record shows that those noble intentions recede behind the craving for power. Even those Islamists who warn against power politics usually do not do so on moral grounds. The debate is one about tactics, rarely about ethics.

This ideology of Islamism ought not to be confused with the general phenomenon of Re-Islamization. A stronger concern for Islam, as a faith and a culture, is felt among Muslims in most parts of the world. This is part of the worldwide search for roots in tradition. Re-Islamization is a quest for authenticity, not a hunt for enemies. It is not a turning *against* someone, but a turning *toward* the own self. Re-Islamization has engendered some Islamic reform movements with a vision of the world diametrically opposed to that of the Islamists.

Re-Islamization is like a river, Islamism like a raft. The raft benefits from the current, it floats in the river, but it is not of the same material, it is wood, not water. There is a likelihood that the raft will capsize in the river.

So far Islamists are ruling only two and a half countries: Iran, Sudan and part of Afghanistan. They ruled Pakistan for some 13 years (1977-1990), and they hold a significant share of power in Yemen. In Saudi Arabia they do not share power, but they wield enormous influence, tantamount to sharing power.

Islamists have their ideologues and chief ideologues. Although split into a dozen rival tendencies they do not cease working for the establishment of an *Islamist Internationale*. Arab analysts even speak of a *Third Islamist Internationale*. The First was a Saudi-led Internationale in the 70s, the Second an Iranian-led Internationale in the 80s, the Third is a Sudan-led Internationale in the 90s.

SUDAN AS A MATRIX OF CONFLICTS.

Sudan's de facto head, Dr. Hasan At-Turabi, is presently the most dynamic and successful Islamist leader. He is the General Secretary of the PAIC (POPULAR ARAB ISLAMIC CONFERENCE) with headquarters in Khartoum. As a result, the focus of Islamist activities has shifted, at least in part, from Asia to Africa. As the largest country in Africa, Sudan borders on eight states, and all of those complain about Sudanese interference or subversion, usually via extremist organizations of local Islamists who receive funding or weapons from Khartoum.

This is most blatant in the case of Erithrea, whose predominantly Muslim population has chosen a Christian as its president. Erithrea has repeatedly complained to the UN about an Islamist insurgency that is totally dependent on Sudan. There is much talk about war between the two countries. Ethiopia has similar complaints, and so has Kenya.

Muslims in Kenya constitute some 20% of the population. Most of them side with the government, for better or for worse. In Mombasa, the country's second largest and predominantly Muslim city, a young radical of Arab origin, Shaikh Khalid Balala, has

founded an ISLAMIC PARTY OF KENYA and staged violent demonstrations. Kenyan authorities claim to possess evidence that Balala did so at the behest of Sudan's Islamist leadership. Balala is frequent guest in Khartoum.

Sudan's conflict with Uganda has deteriorated into a kind of border war.

Khartoum has a problem with all of those neighboring countries inasmuch as they do not cooperate in quelling the insurgency in Southern Sudan. None of Sudan's Black African neighbor states can stay neutral vis-a-vis the war between Northern Sudan's Arabized Muslims and the largely Christianized Africans in Southern Sudan.

The entire conflict might be presented as one of a regional nature, to be resolved by a compromise: You do not help my insurgents and I do not help yours.

However, Sudan also supports Islamist insurgents in the North. Egyptian Islamists take refuge in Sudan and infiltrate back into Egypt - with weapons. In the 1994 civil war between North and South Yemen, Sudan sided with the North, because that was the cause of the Yemeni Islamists.

Most Africans tend to view the war in Sudan as one between an Arab - or Arabized - nation in the North and an African nation in the South, with the North occupying the South by way of an age-old expansionism in the name of Islamic religion. Even many African Muslims in Chad, Zaire, Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia sympathize with the Southern Sudanese. Here the bonds of race prove to be stronger than those of religion. Even in Tanzania,

which does not border Sudan, Muslims are divided on this issue. Those of mixed (Arab) blood tend to side with the North, whereas those of African stock tend to side with the South.

But the attitudes are often expressed with an argumentation other than that of race. Many Muslims reason that the genocidal war carried out by the Islamists from Northern Sudan is un-Islamic.

This feeling is genuine, but there is a pragmatic side to it too. Many African Muslims in the neighboring countries feel uneasy about the war propaganda unfolded by the regime in Khartoum. The Islamists propagate this war as a jihád - a "Holy War" against the infidels. This causes many Africans in other states to fear and hate their Muslim fellow citizens. It creates tensions between Christians and Muslims in large parts of Africa. Sudanese relations with the Northern-dominated regime in neighboring Chad are relatively good, with Islamist teachers from Sudan indoctrinating Chadian Muslims. The result is another outbreak of the old conflict between Chad's Muslim North and Christian South. The country has a history of civil war not unlike that of Sudan. If Chad is to stay together, it needs serious efforts at reconciliation between North and South, between Muslims and Christians. Khartoum's influence has the opposite effect.

Outside Sudan, Islamists are busy projecting the Sudanese war as one of an African nation against the American superpower: 'A Third World country is struggling to preserve its independence and national unity. The majority of the Southern Sudanese are with the government, only a minority fights, instigated by Israel and the

United States.'

This contrasts sharply with the other propaganda, for local (Northern Sudanese) consumption, that accuses the regime's opponents of "Negro racism" and calls for the conversion of the South to Islam. Southerners complain of forced conversion. At a huge Islamist rally in Chicago in December 1994, a Sudanese stand displayed photos of recent group conversions in Southern Sudan.

One West African state after another has gone through an Islamist crisis. One of the first to witness the creation of an Islamist force was Senegal. The MUSTARSHIDINA group was led by a professor of philosophy whose followers may not have been more than 500 (instead of the 500,000 he claimed), but that gave him enough of a nuisance value. In February 1994, riots led to the death of five policeman and a civilian. The situation was soon brought under control, chiefly because of Senegal's strong tradition of Sufi Islam, which is a major obstacle in the way of Islamism. The case exemplifies a recurrent phenomenon of sectarian unrest in several African states. The important point is that such unrest is mostly instigated from abroad, in the seventies chiefly by Libya, in the eighties by Iran, in the nineties by Sudan, though the Iranian pressure has not abated.

In 1994 Mauritania witnessed an upsurge of Islamism, but this, too, was swiftly terminated. Several thousand Islamists had come to Mauritania from various countries, as if they wanted to turn this country into a second Pakistan, which Islamists used as a launching pad for their conquest of Afghanistan. In Mauritania they wanted to

be supportive of Islamists in neighboring Algeria, even though the geography was not propitious for such a purpose. Since they found little response among the local population, the Mauritanian government had no difficulty bringing the situation under control once the full dimensions of this infiltration were recognized.

After Mauritania it is now Niger's turn. Here, too, the repercussions of the Islamist insurgency in neighboring Algeria are felt strongly. Apart from this, Islamists have found a stronger response among the locals than in Mauritania.

Building upon ancient cultural and even ethnic ties with the East African coast, Iranian emissaries are actively at work in Mozambique, but concentrate primarily on Tanzania. Already in 1993 Daressalam felt constrained to expel three Sudanese preachers, accusing them of subversive activities. Here as elsewhere the issue was Islamist propaganda against the country's secular constitution. They insist that a country with a Muslim majority ought not to be ruled by Non-Muslims. The proportion of Muslims in Tanzania is probably around 55%, more or less analogous to Nigeria. Both countries subscribe to secularism as a means of forging harmony between the communities as partners in states that would be ungovernable if one of the religious communities were to dominate.

In Islamist propaganda secularism is the supreme evil. Secularism rules out the application of Islam's traditional law, the *sharí'a*. The Islamists demand introduction of the *sharí'a* because it grants Muslims privileges as compared to Non-Muslim citizens.

9

ISLAMIST MODES OF OPERATION.

Although Sudan makes great strides toward becoming the major Islamist player in Africa, it lacks the resources and has not yet been able to match the long-standing and well-greased efforts of Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the late 1960's, Saudi Arabia intensified its financial support for Islamist parties all over. Numerous institutions were created to make Islamism prevail. Most important among these is the MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE, with its many suborganizations, such as the INTERNATIONAL MOSQUE COUNCIL. Through these institutions preachers and teachers trained at fundamentalist seminaries in Arabia were dispatched to African countries to bring local communities under the heel. In Kenya those Saudi institutions had 28 Arabia-trained propagandists on their payroll already in 1982. In the meantime the number has tripled.

Secular-minded members of the Saudi establishment saw this policy as a means of thwarting the advance of communism. Over time, however, this foreign policy developed a dynamism of its own, at times appearing to run counter to the interests of the secular arm of the Saudi government.

For instance, Sudan was seen as the leading food supplier for the Arabian Peninsula. This presupposes stability, something impossible under an Islamist dictatorship. In order to enjoy stability, a population consisting of Muslims, Animists and Christians requires a secularist system of government. But the Islamists chose Sudan to become a staging ground for their ideological conquest of Africa.

Khartoum can still count on support among some powerful circles within Saudi Arabia, despite open hostility between the two governments. Riyadh continues to fund Islamist organizations in many countries, seeking to salvage those elements that have not been swayed by Khomeinist extremism or bought by Iranian money. There can be no doubt that the virulent brand of Khomeinism has a stronger natural appeal for college students than does the Saudi variant of Islamism, though it would be a grave mistake to assume that the institutions financed by Saudi Arabia represent "moderate" Islam. Quite the contrary. The irony is that the Iranians are reaping what the Saudis have sowed. What Riyadh cultivated painstakingly for more than twenty years, Tehran took over in barely a decade.

Iran operates chiefly on four levels:

First, by mobilizing Shi'is among the Lebanese settled in most West African countries, and Indians in East and South Africa. HEZBOLLAH (GOD'S PARTY) is a generic term referring to Iran-led activists anywhere in the world. It is inaccurate to associate the term solely with Lebanon, as is often done. In West Africa, however, it is very much a Lebanese phenomenon. Most of the Lebanese settled here - often since generations - are Shi'is. The majority used to support the relatively moderate Lebanese-Shi'i movement AMAL (HOPE). As in Lebanon, Iran used all its influence to make HEZBOLLAH prevail over AMAL, with considerable success. Iran-trained Lebanese operatives were sent to West Africa with money, propaganda material, and even arms.

But Tehran's success in making Shi'is toe the line has negative effects for the Lebanese community at large. Their situation has always been somewhat precarious, with many Africans resenting their economic success and disproportionate influence in the politics of their countries. HEZBOLLAH activities have aroused genuine suspicions. Apart from that, western complaints about HEZBOLLAH provide the pretext for a backlash against the Lebanese community. In this way Islamism has brought suffering to the Lebanese in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Congo, Gabon and Zaire.

The same applies to Shi'is of Indian descent in Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa; as well as to the Shirazis in Tanzania, a people of mixed Persian-African stock. They all live in a fragile social environment because of African prejudices against them. To single them out for the role of a political vanguard will bring more harm to them than profit to Iran.

Second, by assuming leadership of disaffected Sunni sections.

The case is not different with Kenya's coastal people, the Waswahili. 17% are considered to be of Arab descent. Assuming leadership of a minority from among this minority, Shaikh Khalid Balala declared a *jihád* against the government and threatened his opponents with death. At first sight this looks too ludicrous to warrant serious attention. The operation looked suicidal, pathological. But it served the ends of both Khartoum and Tehran who wished to punish Nairobi for its pro-American policies. Mombasa

being of importance to the US/UN intervention in Somalia, they could have easily have a number of American personnel killed over there. Hoping to exploit tensions between Nairobi and Washington, they kept the unrest in Mombasa low, giving it the character of a warning shot for President Moi.

Thousands of Muslim demonstrators in Mombasa were used as expendable figures in a political game, regardless of what consequences their foolhardiness would ultimately have within their social environment of African Muslims and Christians.

In this way Iran made inroads into areas of solid African Sunni Islam, especially Northern Nigeria. Ultimately this may turn out to be more beneficial than all the adventures along the coast of East and West Africa. As Africa's most populous country Nigeria carries weight, and Northern Nigeria is predominantly Muslim, with an Islamic tradition. There are no indigenous Shi'is anywhere in Africa, but in Northern Nigeria at least one fifth of the Muslim population has been so thoroughly won over to the cause of Iranian Islamism that they are commonly referred to as Shi'is, as if they had formally converted from Sunnism to Shi'ism.

Third, **by using propaganda means on the pattern of China and the Soviet Union at the height of their ideological activity.** This includes the establishment of Islamic centers, often huge ones, in places such as Daressalam or Freetown; the launching of newspapers and magazines, or the purchase of already established ones; the creation of friendship societies and front organizations; etc. Islamists flood African Muslims with publications of all kinds, for

young and old, for men and women. They proffer direct and indirect propaganda in a number of African languages. To mention but one example: *Africa Events*, one of several weekly newsmagazines on Africa coming out of London, was utilized as a means to disseminate Iranian-inspired Islamism. An un-initiated reader would conclude that *Africa Events* was a degree more nationalist (anti-colonialist) than the liberal *Africa Now* or *Jeune Afrique*. The Iranian sponsors knew how to administer the proper dosage of their propaganda.

Another means is that of inviting large numbers of Muslims, Sunnis no less than Shi'is, to Iran. Most are taken on guided tours that overawe the invitees and make them return as dedicated adepts of the Islamist cause. Others are made to study or train in Iran for longer periods. Those then return as Hezbollahis (propagandists, organizers) or terrorists.

Fourth, through front organizations and 'joint ventures' with Libya and Sudan. There is rivalry between Shi'i Iran and Sunni Sudan, but both subscribe to Islamism as a new category, different from the Islam of the vast majority of Muslims.

An example of cooperation was the opening of Sudanese embassies in several West African states. Khartoum opened those embassies at the behest of Tehran, with Iranian funding. Sudanese embassies aroused less suspicion than Iranian embassies. At the urging of the North African neighbor states, those Iranian/Sudanese 'joint enterprises' in West Africa had to close. In the meantime the Sudanese regime has become so exposed that it is no longer useful as a camouflage for Iran.

THE EFFECTS OF ISLAMIST ACTIVITIES.

The advent of Islamism signals tensions and instability.

First, it increases conflict among Muslims. Islamism is a new element, and usually it comes handy as a means to usurp leadership of the community. More often than not it provides an opportunity for fringe elements to take over the center. (An example, now serving Islamists as a model, is Afghanistan, the present Islamist leadership of which is the creation of foreign secret services, so much so that most Afghans feel they are ruled by strangers). Invariably, Islamism is a disruptive force in Muslim societies.

In Kenya the advent of Islamism has widened the cleavage between coastal people of Arab/Indian descent and non-Arab Muslims. The latter are organized in the pro-government UMA (UNITED MUSLIMS OF AFRICA), the Islamists in the IPK (ISLAMIC PARTY OF KENYA).

The battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for Islamist - and Muslim - leadership is felt all around the world, but perhaps nowhere as virulently as in Africa. The Islamist rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran resembles the rivalry between Moscow and Beijing. As yet they are not fighting an open war by proxy as in Afghanistan, though in Sudan they are close to a repetition of the Afghan case. The African battleground being much larger, there is more variation to the Iranian/Saudi conflict than in Afghanistan. Saudi-sponsored Islamists have their own 'Trinity of Evil': "The missionary steamroll, the Zionist offensive, and Iranian expansionism."

Qaddafi has somewhat run out of steam, but in some African

countries his emissaries are still at work, seeking to influence governments or to topple them. Although the Libyan regime is at war with the Islamists at home, it continues to use the Islamist card abroad. The result of such disparate meddling by foreign powers is additional divisiveness in Muslim communities.

Second, it aggravates friction between Muslims and Non-Muslims. Christians become fearful that all Muslims might turn to Islamism. Their reactions help the Islamists to further fan the flames of communal hatred. The conflict between Islam and Christianity is one of the major sources of instability in Africa. In Western Europe and America, many Christians and Muslims are getting together to emphasize the things they have in common. Inter-religious dialogue is mushrooming, and the concept of mission is being redefined as a mission of all believers to the world at large. Proselytizing is out, pluralism is in. Not so in Africa, which is still a battlefield where the major confessions seek to establish their supremacy.

The rise of a double Fundamentalist Internationale, one Evangelical, the other Islamist, exacerbates those tensions. Zambia came under the sway of U.S. based fundamentalists who began to persecute the country's Muslim minority, while Sudan is ruled by the most ruthless Islamists. One reinforces the other. The result is an escalation of murderous clashes between Christians and Muslims. So far Nigeria has had the lion share of this inter-religious bloodshed, but the potential exists in some two dozen countries.

Their bitter feud notwithstanding, Iran-oriented and Saudi-oriented Islamists are one in their vociferous campaign against Christian missionary activities and Christian power-sharing in countries with substantive Muslim populations. They still bewail the fall of Idi Amin, despite the fact that in Uganda Muslims are less then 10% of the population.

Such supremacism is not only offensive to Non-Muslims, it also has a retarding effect on Muslims. There is no dearth of Muslim intellectuals who realize how injurious such obsession with power is to the Muslim mind. They wish for an emancipation of their communities from such type of supremacism. They want their people to learn how to be partners, junior partners, if need be. But they lack the means to withstand the enormous propaganda campaign unleashed by the Islamists.

Pro-Iranian and pro-Saudi Islamists are also united in their demand that the *sharí'a* be introduced. This is one of the most divisive issues in African societies. Animists and Christians reject this demand as humiliating. *Sharí'a* punishments (cutting off the hands and feet, crucifixion etc.) meted out to Christians caused the renewed outbreak of the Sudanese civil war in 1983. Reformist Muslims want to see the *sharí'a* brought up to date. They reject the Islamist demand as a distortion of Islam and degrading. The Islamists, however, win adherents because the unchanged *sharí'a* allows almost limitless polygamy, makes divorce more than easy, and frees men of their obligation toward divorced women and their children.

By declaring the *sharí'a* to be a divine law (as if it were part of the Koran), Islamists succeed in gaining some following among Muslims who are made to believe that they owe no allegiance to man-made laws. The demand that Muslim minorities be allowed to have their own "family laws" is a favorite stratagem to create a mood of defiance. It helps Islamist agitators gain profile as defenders of the "legitimate rights" of the community. In the course of this ploy, relations between Muslims and Non-Muslims are damaged.

These tactics cause harm even to Islam, religiously, because fear of the *sharí'a* makes quite a few Muslims convert to Christianity, mostly women, and especially children of mixed marriages. The Islamists are not unaware of this, but what counts for them is the short-term political advantage, not the long-term religious damage. This is one more evidence that we are dealing here with a political movement, not a religious reform. The tirades against Christians missions are not motivated by a concern for the faith but by the desire to replace western influence.

Third, the development and foreign policy of the respective countries is affected negatively. Islamists propagate confrontation with the West. They advocate close relations with Iran and Sudan as well as support for Iraq and Libya. The latter two are not Islamist states, but they are in a conflict with the United States. The primacy of anti-westernism is evident from their transcending the world of Islam, in the sense that Islamists cultivate friendship with states such as Cuba and North Korea. Libyan support for anti-

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 05983 852 2

Muslim Serbia is conveniently overlooked, Qaddafi's anti-Americanism being more important.

Islamists militate against development efforts connected with the West, regardless of what their own position might otherwise be. With Khomeini's coming to power, Tehran opposed family planning tooth and nail. Ten years later the policy was reversed radically and today Iran is almost a model country for birth control. In Africa, however, Tehran's emissaries continue to attack western aid for family planning. [1]

At the 1994 UN Conference for Population Control and Development in Cairo, Iran's representative played a seemingly constructive role. But all over Africa Islamists denounced the "Conference of Immorality" as a conspiracy by the Christian West to reduce the number of Muslims. Such propaganda had an insidious effect in African countries where Christians and Muslims seek to outnumber one another. The countries most fiercely opposed to the Cairo Conference were Sudan and Saudi Arabia.

In mostly arrtificial nation states, African societies are vulnerable to ethnic and religious strife. The additional unrest provoked by Islamists makes prospects for peace and prosperity seem even more remote.

---

[1] "A document from the US involving fake Islamic texts is now in circulation in Nigeria... The US has been using such covert tactics and falsified documents to influence attitudes toward birth-control not only in Nigeria but elsewhere too." Bubba Abba Kyari, "Making family planning respectable in Nigeria," *Crescent International*, Toronto, July 16-31, 91.

ISBN 0-16-047206-7

90000

9 780160 472060